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Executive Summary 
1. Background 
Pedestrian accidents are one of the most prominent causes of premature injury, handicap and death in the 
modern world. In children, the problem is so severe that pedestrian accidents are widely regarded as the 
most serious of all health risks facing children in developed countries. Not surprisingly, educational 
measures have long been advocated as a means of teaching children how to cope with traffic and substantial 
resources have been devoted to their development and provision. Unfortunately, there seems to be a 
widespread view at the present time that education has not achieved as much as had been hoped and that 
there may even be quite strict limits to what can be achieved through education. This would, of course, shift 
the emphasis away from education altogether towards engineering or urban planning measures aimed at 
creating an intrinsically safer environment in which the need for education might be reduced or even 
eliminated. However, whilst engineering measures undoubtedly have a major role to play in the effort to 
reduce accidents, this outlook is both overly optimistic about the benefits of engineering and overly 
pessimistic about the limitations of education. At the same time, a fresh analysis is clearly required both of 
the aims and methods of contemporary road safety education. The present report is designed to provide such 
an analysis and to establish a framework within which further debate and research can take place. 
2. Setting objectives 
No educational programme can expect to succeed unless it is founded on clear and explicitly-stated 
objectives. Without these, the programme would be unfocused and evaluation impossible. Unfortunately, 
this basic requirement has not been well served by road safety initiatives in the UK. Many programmes in 
this country set themselves only the most general of aims, such as 'reducing accidents'. Such aims are 
perfectly laudable but are far too broad to be functional as educational objectives. Where programmes do set 
more fine-grained objectives, the majority are concerned with improving children's knowledge about traffic 
or instilling good attitudes towards safety. Implicit in such programmes is the assumption that changes in 
knowledge or attitudes will lead to changes in actual traffic behaviour. However, this confounds a secondary 
objective (improving knowledge) with a primary objective (improving behaviour). Whether the one leads to 
the other is an empirical question requiring demonstration. In fact, the evidence suggests that there is no 
direct link between knowledge and behaviour at all, raising serious questions about the validity of much 
traditional road safety education. 
Deciding how to set concrete objectives, then, remains a fundamental problem in road safety. We believe the 
most scientific way of doing this would be to provide a detailed analysis of the pedestrian task, breaking it 
down into the component skills and strategies required to deal with the various problems encountered in 
traffic. Understanding the skills and strategies needed to interact with traffic would seem an obvious 
starting-point for the development of educational objectives. For example, if it could be demonstrated that 
children lack the skills needed to tackle a particular road task, then an appropriate objective might be to 
teach those skills. If unable to benefit from such training, for example until a certain stage of psychological 
development had been reached, it might still be possible to develop a more limited strategy suitable to the 
skill level of younger children. In the extreme case, it might be necessary to recommend that the child 
should not tackle certain road tasks at all. However, all such decisions should be based on solid empirical 
data concerning the skills that children possess at different ages and on whether acquisition of such skills is 
possible. 
The argument being made is that pedestrians require a range of fundamental skills in order to interact safely 
with traffic. They must also learn to deploy these skills strategically at the roadside. While a definitive 
taxonomy is probably not possible, we believe the following are among the most critical psychological skills 
involved in road behaviour. It should also be noted that many tasks will require the deployment of several 
underlying psychological abilities at the same time.  
Detecting the presence of traffic: the detection of traffic involves a range of basic processes including 
selective attention; visual search; resistance to distractibility; co-ordination of visual and auditory 
information; and the perception of crossing locations as safe or dangerous (in terms of the opportunities they 
afford for detecting approaching traffic). 
Visual timing judgements: this requires the pedestrian to determine a vehicle's direction and rate of 
movement so that accurate time-to-contact judgements can be made. Such judgements provide information 
about the time available for crossing. 
Co-ordinating information from different directions: the pedestrian rarely has to deal with traffic 
approaching from a single direction: thus, timing and other judgements must be made in relation to vehicles 
approaching from two or more directions. This requires the ability to divide attention; to hold information in 
memory; and to co-ordinate and integrate this information. 
Co-ordinating perception and action: this involves the ability to relate the time available for crossing to 
the time required to cross. The latter will vary according to characteristics of the individual's own movement 
as well as to factors such as the width of the road. Such knowledge about movement capability must then be 
calibrated to visual information about the time available for crossing so that realistic safety margins can be 
set and other decisions made. 
3. Skill development in children 
Even crossing a simple road, then, requires competence in a range of primary perceptuo-motor and cognitive 
skills. If these skills are not properly developed, the pedestrian's crossing decisions will almost certainly be 
inadequate. From an educational point of view, it is therefore vital to know how these skills develop in 
childhood and what level of skill can be expected in children of different ages. It is also essential to know 
whether baseline performance can be improved through education or training and, if so, at what age 
intervention is most likely to be effective. 
3.1 Potential for training 
The evidence reviewed in the report demonstrates clear developmental trends on a wide range of 
psychological skills related to traffic behaviour. However, it also suggests that many of these skills are 
considerably more advanced in even young children than has previously been assumed. Moreover, the 
evidence strongly suggests that many of them may be amenable to training, provided that appropriate 
training methods are employed. This outlook stands in marked contrast to a widely-held view in the road 
safety field that children are inherently incapable of dealing with the traffic environment until they have 
reached a certain level of cognitive development, typically the Piagetian stage of concrete operations. We 
argue that such a view is based on early and somewhat misguided interpretations of Piagetian theory, which 
considerably underestimated the abilities of the young child.  
3.2 Behavioural training 
Consistent with this, there is a substantial literature specifically within the field of road safety, demonstrating 
the success of training a variety of road crossing skills, provided this is carried out in a meaningful context 
that closely simulates the road environment. For example, recent studies have demonstrated significant 
improvements in children's ability to make roadside timing judgements (Lee et al., 1984; Demetre et al., 
1992); find safe places to cross (Ampofo-Boateng et al., 1991); plan safe routes (Thomson et al., 1992); 
cross at parked cars (Rothengatter, 1981); and cross safely at junctions (Rothengatter, 1981). Furthermore, 
such training can be successfully employed with very young children. Whereas pre-eminent classroom 
techniques such as the Green Cross Code cannot even be recommended for use with children under seven 
years of age (on account of the verbal skills that they require), when taught behaviourally such strategies can 
lead to significant improvements in the roadside judgements of children as young as four years 
(Rothengatter, 1981). By contrast, evaluation of knowledge-based approaches has provided little evidence to 
suggest that they are effective in improving children's roadside judgements. 
As stated above, this stems in part from early interpretations of Piagetian theory, according to which young 
children's traffic decisions are limited by their age and stage of cognitive development. However, 
contemporary developmental theory views Piagetian models of development as considerably more flexible 
than was previously thought. Indeed, the major bodies of developmental theory share a number of features 
which convincingly explain why practical training approaches are successful and why knowledge-based 
approaches are not. 
4. Developmental theorists 
4.1 J.J. Gibson 
Although not strictly a developmental theorist, the work of J. J. Gibson has made major contributions to 
understanding of the development and acquisition of perceptuo-motor skills. In Gibsonian terms, the 
pedestrian task is essentially a perceptuo-motor problem rather than one of higher-order interpretation and 
cognitive construction. Gibson's theory of perception states that, through evolutionary pressure, the visual 
system has become attuned to salient temporal information in the optic array specifying directly the time-to-
contact of approaching objects or surfaces, thus eliminating the need for cognitive construction based on 
information about speed and distance. Furthermore, for Gibson, perception is ultimately bound to action, and 
environmental events are perceived in terms of the potential for action which they afford. Thus, the 
developmental task is one of attunement and refinement of the visual system to temporal information in the 
optic array and the actions which such information affords. One major implication of this is that perceptual 
judgements and motor responses can only be learned in the context in which they occur, or at least in close 
analogues of them. Perceptuo-motor learning is thus a bottom-up process, progressing from learning in 
specific contexts to more generalised conceptions. Practical road safety training thus works because it 
provides the opportunity for this process to take place. 
4.2 Piaget 
This general pattern of learning is also implicit in the hugely influential work of Jean Piaget. For Piaget, 
learning proceeds from context-bound actions (beginning in infancy with reflexes) towards increasingly 
generalised conceptual understanding. The key mechanism of change is the child's co-ordination of initially 
separate pieces of knowledge about different events, which occurs as they seek to understand and resolve 
conflicts between their expectations and actual experience. For example, if the child found that it took longer 
than expected to cross an unfamiliar road, s/he might then notice that the road was also wider than those 
previously encountered. In this way, co-ordinating information about different events allows them to 
perceive the more general relationships between road width and crossing time. This Piagetian emphasis on 
learning as a bottom-up process of construction from specific actions in specific contexts bears clear 
similarities to Gibson's account of the development and acquisition of perceptuo-motor skills. It also stands 
in marked contrast to the practice in many road safety programmes, where knowledge is taught at a general 
level in the belief that this will then transfer to the many specific situations to be faced at the roadside. 
4.3 Vygotsky 
The idea of learning as a bottom-up process introduces the work of L. S. Vygotsky, widely regarded 
alongside Piaget as the other great theorist in developmental psychology. For Vygotsky, all thought is the 
mental equivalent of action and has its origins within action. For example, counting the number of books on 
a shelf is the mental analogue of the developmentally earlier task of physically moving the objects into a row 
while counting. The second point of importance in Vygotsky's theory is that all organised action takes place 
in conjunction with those who have already mastered it (e.g. the child counting with an adult). This 
introduces the crucial Vygotskian notion of the zone of proximal development (ZPD). The ZPD is a 
psychological rather than a physical space, referring to the difference between that which the child can 
achieve alone and that which s/he can potentially achieve whilst working with a more competent other. The 
ZPD is thus the space within which learning occurs and learning itself is a process of internalising directed 
activity. For Vygotsky, then, learning is necessarily grounded in a social context, whereas Piaget conceived 
of learning as being largely a process of internal construction within the individual (albeit one which could 
be socially motivated). However, in common with Piaget, Vygotsky considered learning to be a bottom-up 
process with complex activities building upon simpler ones, with the range encompassed by the zone of 
proximal development advancing as learning progresses.  
Developmental theory, then, almost with one voice argues for the natural progression of understanding from 
action to concept. It follows that pedestrian training methods will be most effective when they operate in 
accordance with this progression rather than when they work against it. From this point of view, practical 
training methods are successful because they begin at the correct point in the developmental sequence. 
Knowledge-based approaches are much less successful because they do not. 
5. Rate of development 
There remains the important question of the age at which training should begin. Previously, Piaget's stages 
of development have been interpreted as representing biological constraints on the rate of development. That 
is, a child would not be able to perform a given task until the appropriate level of cognitive development had 
been reached. Such assertions led researchers such as Sandels (1975) to argue that children below the age of 
8-9 years must be inherently unsafe pedestrians. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the cognitive requirements of 
the pedestrian task may be less than has been assumed, and the basic perceptuo-motor skills ought 
theoretically to be within the capabilities of even young children. More importantly, Sandels' argument is 
based on a misconception of the significance of stages in Piagetian theory. Given the bottom-up nature of 
the process of construction, it is more appropriate to view Piaget's stages as emergent characteristics of the 
developing child rather than overarching constraints. The Piagetian stages map out what might be a typical 
progression in the average child in the absence of educational intervention and are now regarded as 
considerably more elastic from a timing point of view than was previously supposed. Indeed, a child may 
perform at several different Piagetian stages at one and the same time, depending on the nature of the tasks 
and other factors. The interpretation of developmental stages as rigid, age-bound categories precluding 
educational intervention is certainly unwarranted. The real strength of Piagetian theory is now regarded as 
lying in its account of the process of development rather than in any indication of the timing of specific 
developmental changes. There is nothing in this account to suggest other than that practical training should 
be successful with children as young as 4 years of age, providing it offers the right kinds of experience. 
6. Generalisability of learning 
In devising any training programme, a major issue to be addressed is the extent to which we can expect 
abilities learned in one context to generalise to others. This issue is a topic of much debate in contemporary 
developmental psychology but, on balance, the evidence suggests that there is a marked tendency for 
knowledge to be compartmentalised. Transfer from one task to another is possible, but the tasks must bear 
functional similarities to each other. Such correspondences must also be salient for the learner. Current road 
safety programmes which assume that children will spontaneously extend understanding gained in one 
context (e.g., the classroom) to behaviour in another (e.g., the roadside) are therefore poorly supported both 
by theory and by empirical evidence. The implication is that it would be better to focus on promoting 
development from scratch in the context in which the learning will be used - i.e., at the roadside or 
something closely analogous - than in general discussions about what one might or might not do while 
sitting round a table.  
7. The social context of training: interactive learning 
Developmental theory provides clear indications, then, as to why practical training carried out in a 
meaningful context has proved to be more successful than classroom based methods. It also suggests that, so 
long as the focus is on promoting appropriate action in close analogues of the road environment, training 
could easily begin with children as young as 4 or 5 years of age. In addition to this, contemporary extensions 
of Piagetian and Vygotskian theory also provide a framework for the development of appropriate training 
methods, utilising what has become known as interactive learning (i.e., the learning that takes place through 
social interaction). 
7.1 Peer collaboration 
As noted above, for Piaget it is conflict between ideas and experience that provides the impetus for 
conceptual advance, by necessitating resolution of the conflict. This points to the potential role of peer 
discussion in learning, particularly when children work together in a group. In such cases, the group 
becomes a forum for the exchange of ideas as to how the task might be solved and, because peers typically 
share the same communicative style and are less inhibited about talking with each other, this usually permits 
a fairly full airing of different views. During such exchanges, there is thus a strong probability that children 
will be exposed to ideas that are different to their own and that internal cognitive conflict will be created. 
The subsequent personal resolution of this conflict results in development. There has been much research in 
recent years investigating the effects of this kind of peer collaboration. The evidence not only supports the 
general principle that such learning is effective, but also suggests that it has particular impact on conceptual 
advance (Howe, Tolmie and Rogers, 1992; Tolmie, Howe, MacKenzie and Greer, 1993). 
7.2 Peer tutoring 
By contrast, the Vygotskian emphasis on the role of guided action has been applied to a different interactive 
learning technique, that of peer tutoring. Peer tutoring refers to a dyadic interaction in which one partner, 
who is the more competent, tutors the other, less competent partner. The asymmetry of this relationship 
meets the basic condition for establishing the zone of proximal development. Research into the processes 
and outcomes of peer tutoring indicates positive effects on learning in line with the predictions of 
Vygotskian theory, particularly as regards the opportunities it affords for structuring the activity of the less 
competent partner. This evidence also suggests that peer tutoring is best suited to the development of skills, 
as opposed to reasoning or problem-solving tasks (Damon, 1984). However, there are clear signs of 
limitations in children's role-taking abilities, their ability to tailor verbal directions, and their sensitivity to 
the needs of others (e.g. Peterson, 1972) which limit the effectiveness of peer tutoring. For these reasons it is 
possible that adult-child interaction, when it operates along similar lines, may hold more promise for road 
safety training with younger children. There are considerable parallels between peer tutoring and this form 
of adult-child interaction since, as Rogoff (1986) points out, the interaction remains one of guided 
participation and is as much a step away from direct instruction as peer tutoring is. 
In the context of road safety education, then, it seems likely that adult-child interaction has the potential to 
make concrete the skills involved in safe road crossing and thus fulfil an important and effective role in any 
training programme. Peer collaboration could be applied to fill a complementary role in the development of 
conceptual understanding of the traffic environment and the deployment of skills, although this would entail 
careful task design to ensure that group dialogue was channelled along productive lines (see Tolmie et al., 
1993).  
We suggest that interactive learning techniques hold considerable promise in the context of road safety 
education. Moreover, there is a growing literature which clarifies how such techniques might be applied 
most effectively. Whilst it remains necessary to identify precisely how we might capitalise on them in the 
specific context of road safety, studies of adult-led group training of children to find safe crossing places 
provides an existing example of the benefits of interactive learning methods. Such a training procedure has 
been found to produce significant improvements in children's judgements, making them behave like older, 
more experienced pedestrians (Thomson et al., 1992). Few other studies appear to have tackled the 
development of road safety understanding in this way, but the early signs suggest that it holds considerable 
promise. 
8. Conclusions 
In this report we argue that children need a range of fundamental psychological skills in order to interact 
with traffic, together with the ability to deploy these strategically in different traffic situations. We argue 
that viable objectives in road safety education would be to operationally define such skills and strategies and 
devise appropriate training procedures whereby they might be improved. If successful, such training would 
yield direct and measurable changes in children's actual behaviour in traffic, not merely changes in what 
they can say about traffic when questioned by adults. Whilst a long-established tradition in road safety 
asserts that many of these skills cannot be improved through education until a particular stage of 
development has been reached, we challenge that view and argue that it is inconsistent with modern research 
in psychology or, indeed, with the majority view among developmental psychologists. In addition, recent 
studies that have attempted to improve children's performance on a range of clearly-defined pedestrian skills 
have produced empirical evidence that such skills can be accelerated, providing appropriate training is 
given. The critical aspect would appear to be that the training should be practical in nature. Contemporary 
educational approaches arising out of the work of major theorists such as Piaget and Vygotsky provide 
further ideas as to how the benefits of practical training might be maximised by adapting techniques from 
the field of interactive learning. Such approaches deserve to be explored in the effort to derive educational 
interventions capable of leading to tangible improvements in children's ability to cope with the traffic 
environment. 
Abstract 
This report examines the skills and abilities needed by proficient pedestrians, the extent to which road safety 
education aids the growth of these skills in children, and what developmental psychology has to say about 
the form that effective education should take. The authors argue that confusion between teaching children 
about the traffic environment and teaching them how to behave within it has led to an emphasis on 
classroom activities and learning of abstract rules. Neither appear successful when compared to programmes 
that give children practical training and experience. Developmental psychology indicates this is because 
learning proceeds most naturally from specific behaviours in specific contexts towards the gradual 
elaboration of more general understanding. It follows that road safety education should begin by teaching 
appropriate behaviour within realistic contexts, with more explicit knowledge building up gradually from 
this experience. Interactive learning techniques, in particular adult-led guidance of behaviour at the roadside 
combined with peer discussion of the rationale for that behaviour, present the best methods of intervention 
because they capitalise on the natural process of learning. There is no reason why training of this kind 
should not begin at the start of primary school. 
Introduction 
Road accidents are one of the most prominent causes of premature illness, handicap and death in the modern 
world. Indeed, a recent report from the Royal College of Physicians stated that accidental injury "is probably 
the most serious of all the major health problems in the developed countries". The problem is particularly 
marked in child pedestrians, who typically suffer a casualty rate four times that of adults at all levels of 
severity. When we take into account that children are much less exposed to traffic than adults (and therefore 
have many fewer 'opportunities' to get knocked down), this trend becomes even more marked (e.g., 
Howarth, Routledge and Repetto-Wright, 1974). Little wonder that one authority has described accidents as 
"for children, the plague in modern guise" (Rothengatter, 1981a). In spite of significant improvements since 
the 1960s and 70s, epidemiologists continue to regard pedestrian accidents as of epidemic proportions and a 
profound cause for concern (e.g., Malek, Guyer and Lescohier, 1990; Pless, 1991). The government has 
responded by joining its European partners in pledging to reduce road casualties by a third before the year 
2000. The question is, how might this best be done?  
In the case of child pedestrian accidents, educational measures have long been introduced as a means of 
teaching children how to cope with traffic and substantial resources have been devoted to their development 
and provision. However, although accident rates have undoubtedly decreased over the last 30 years, it is 
remarkably difficult to know how much of this may be attributed to the effects of education and how much 
to other factors. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that few educational measures introduced at 
either local or national level have been evaluated with regard to their effectiveness in improving children's 
traffic behaviour (Singh, 1982; Thomson, 1991). Moreover, Hillman, Adams and Whitelegg (1990) have 
cogently argued that a major factor underlying the decrease in child casualties between 1971 and 1991 was a 
dramatic reduction in exposure to traffic, caused by greatly increased parental anxiety towards their 
children's safety. In general, there seems to be a widespread feeling at the present time that educational 
measures have not achieved as much as had been hoped and that there may even be quite strict limits on 
what can be achieved through education. This would shift the emphasis away from education altogether 
towards engineering or urban planning measures aimed at creating an intrinsically safer pedestrian 
environment where the need for education would be reduced or even eliminated.  
There is no doubt that engineering and urban planning have central roles to play in the effort to reduce 
pedestrian (and other) road casualties. However, the outlook described above is both overly optimistic about 
the benefits of engineering and overly pessimistic about the limitations of education. At the same time, there 
is no doubt that a fresh analysis is required both of the aims of road safety education and the methods by 
which those aims are met. For these reasons, we believe the time is right for a wide-ranging debate on the 
aims and objectives of road safety education. The present report is designed to provide the framework for 
such a debate. 
In this report, we attempt to re-examine what it is to be a pedestrian, paying particular attention to the skills 
and abilities that underlie proficient traffic behaviour. We argue that one of the central aims of road safety 
education should be to teach such skills. We also argue that children must learn how to deploy the skills 
appropriately in the different traffic situations that will confront them. Although task analysis has been 
advocated by road safety researchers for many years as a means of defining what it is that pedestrians must 
learn to do (and this has led to fundamental reappraisals of the aims of road safety education in some 
countries), the analysis of pedestrian behaviour has remained relatively shallow. Instead, attention has 
focused on a few simple, supposedly global rules for safe pedestrian behaviour together with the broadly 
attitudinal shortcomings of vulnerable pedestrians. Such approaches have been essentially atheoretical, 
usually offering little more than lip service to theories of learning and development. The result, we believe, 
is a range of educational measures that are far less effective in preparing children to face traffic than needs 
be the case. 
The report is divided into six main sections. In Chapter 1 we examine the aims and objectives of road safety 
education, commenting on current objectives and how these might be improved. We also analyse the 
pedestrian task with particular emphasis on the psychological skills and processes that are involved. We then 
review what is known about the development of such processes in childhood. Finally, we consider whether 
development might be promoted through appropriate training. In Chapter 2, we review both the content and 
methods of road safety education, with particular reference to the skills described in Chapter 1, commenting 
on the relative effectiveness of the different approaches that have been attempted to date. We pay special 
attention to practical training methods, which appear to be by far the most effective in preparing children to 
deal with real traffic situations. In Chapter 3, we consider why this should be the case. We also present an 
in-depth analysis of the major theories of development and learning, with emphasis on the work of Piaget 
and Vygotsky, spelling out the implications for road safety education. In Chapter 4, we expand on a 
particular educational approach that has recently evolved out of these major theoretical traditions and shows 
exceptional promise in promoting the development of mathematical and scientific concepts. We offer some 
suggestions as to how this approach might be applied in the field of road safety education in Chapter 5. 
Finally in the Conclusions we summarise the main threads of our argument and make recommendations on 
the basic and strategic research that we believe is now needed in order that effective tools for road safety 
education be developed. 
Chapter 1  
Aims and objectives of road safety education 
1.1 Establishing objectives in road safety education 
No educational programme can expect to succeed unless it is founded on clear and explicitly stated 
objectives. Without these, the programme would be unfocused and evaluation as to whether it had achieved 
what it set out to achieve would be impossible. Moreover, whilst educational programmes are always 
formulated with an ultimate goal in mind, that goal is never a satisfactory educational objective in itself. For 
example, the principal goal of road safety education is to reduce child pedestrian accidents. However, this is 
far too broad to be functional as an educational objective. Any educational programme must set more 
restricted objectives and show how these will contribute towards fulfilment of the ultimate goal. Thus, 
teachers of French cannot simply argue that their objective is to teach students how to speak the language: 
they are required to define a set of far more specific objectives and show how these will lead progressively 
towards increased fluency. Defining what these objectives should be is a difficult task but one that is of 
paramount importance to the effectiveness of any educational programme. Not surprisingly, the problem of 
objective setting has long occupied a central place in educational science (e.g., Bloom, 1956). Unfortunately, 
as we shall see in Chapter 2, this problem has been poorly addressed in traditional road safety education. We 
shall therefore attempt to clarify at the outset what we believe the aims of road safety education should be. 
We also outline a framework within which appropriate educational objectives could be set. 
Objectives can be categorised along a range of dimensions but in road safety the two that have figured most 
prominently are general-specific and primary-secondary (e.g., Rothengatter, 1981a). General objectives, 
whilst not as broad as ultimate goals (such as reducing accidents), remain very global and cannot normally 
be attained except by means of more specific objectives. Examples that have proved generally acceptable 
include that children avoid dangerous situations and that they behave safely (OECD, 1978). Such objectives 
are perfectly sensible but they are not very helpful to the designer of an educational package: what exactly 
do we mean by 'behave safely', for example? In order to operationalise such terms, it is necessary to specify 
far more concrete objectives and show how these will contribute towards attainment of the general objective. 
Unfortunately, although attempts have been made to categorise specific objectives, sometimes in 
considerable detail(e.g., Sheppard, 1975; van der Molen, 1981a), there has been remarkably little agreement 
as to what these should be. According to Rothengatter (1981a), about the only generally accepted concrete 
objective is that children should look before crossing and even then there is no agreement as to what they 
should look for or how they should behave on the basis of what is seen. The fact is, most road safety 
programmes simply do not set concrete objectives or show why the proposed programme should lead to a 
reduction in accident rates. To a large extent, it seems almost to be assumed that if the material deals with 
road safety at all, then it is bound to have beneficial effects (Thomson, 1991). As we shall see, there are no 
grounds for so optimistic a view. 
Related to the distinction between general and specific objectives is the primary-secondary distinction. 
Primary objectives relate directly to the goal: secondary ones merely have an enabling or facilitative role - in 
the sense that a knowledge of mathematics is a necessary prerequisite to the study of engineering, for 
example. In road safety these two kinds of objective are frequently confounded. For instance, it is widely 
assumed that increasing children's knowledge about traffic, or developing positive attitudes towards safety, 
will help reduce children's vulnerability to accidents. However, this can only be expected if changes in 
knowledge and attitudes lead to a primary objective, namely changing how children behave in traffic. The 
underlying aim is to improve children's traffic behaviour, not to increase their knowledge per se. The latter is 
therefore a secondary objective. Whether or not it leads to changes in the primary objective is something that 
requires empirical demonstration. In fact, there does not appear to be a direct link between knowledge and 
behaviour at all, raising serious questions about the validity of a great deal of traditional road safety 
education (Rothengatter, 1981a,b; Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson, 1990). We return to this issue in Chapter 
2. 
1.2 Formulating concrete objectives in road safety education 
The fundamental problem in road safety education, then, is still to decide what constitute valid aims and 
objectives. How is this to be done? A common approach has been to seek the opinion of experts or others 
who might be expected to have insight into the problem. Groups commonly consulted include road safety 
officers, the police, parents and teachers. Such an approach was used in developing the Green Cross Code 
(Sargent and Sheppard, 1974) and in shaping the 38 objectives formulated by Sheppard (1975) in his 
influential paper on the graded acquisition of pedestrian skills. However, it is a moot point as to whether the 
intuitions of adults or even experts represent the best way of determining the content of road safety 
education. In fact, these intuitions are sometimes rather limited. For example, crossing the road near visual 
obstructions is heavily implicated in pedestrian accidents, particularly in children (e.g., O' Donoghue, 1988; 
Assailly, 1992). Yet parents, teachers, road safety officers and the police, when asked to state the most 
important skills needed to cross the road, relegated the choosing of a site where visibility was good to a 
secondary level of importance (Foot, Chapman and Wade, 1982). Similar opinions were expressed during 
formulation of the Green Cross Code (Sargent and Sheppard, 1974). In fact, young children have very little 
ability to recognise dangerous roadside locations, generally judging them to be perfectly safe (Ampofo-
Boateng and Thomson, 1991). Thus, expert opinion is by no means a foolproof source of information 
concerning the abilities and limitations of children. Whilst such insights are valuable, they need to be guided 
by far more objective data concerning the behaviour of children in traffic (Vinje, 1981; van der Molen, 
1981b). 
A more scientific way of establishing objectives would be to analyse the problems posed by the traffic 
environment; the strategies by which an experienced pedestrian might solve these problems; and the 
underlying skills required in order for appropriate strategic behaviour to be possible. Understanding the 
skills needed to interact with traffic and the strategies by which they are deployed would seem to be an 
obvious starting point for the development of educational objectives. For example, if it could be shown that 
children lack the skills needed to tackle a particular road task, an appropriate educational objective might be 
to teach those skills. If children were unable to benefit from such training until a certain age were reached, it 
might nevertheless be possible to teach a more limited strategy that would suit the skill level of younger 
children. In the extreme case, it might be necessary to recommend that the child should not tackle certain 
road tasks at all. However, such recommendations should be based on solid empirical evidence concerning 
the skills that children possess at different ages and on whether or not it is possible to accelerate acquisition 
of the skills through training. 
1.3 Analysing the road crossing task 
The first attempts to analyse the road crossing task and its underlying functional processes were made by 
Older and Grayson (1974) and Avery (1974). More detailed analyses have been made by van der Molen 
(1981a), who used task analysis to identify over 200 sub-divisions of the road crossing task; and Vinje 
(1981), who attempted to outline both the functional processes involved in road crossing and their 
development. Older and Grayson argued for a basic distinction to be made between location selection and 
time selection, dividing each into four stages: observation, perception, judgement and decision. For example, 
traffic must first be perceived (by which the authors seem to mean that its presence must be detected) and 
this requires observation. Judgements must then be made about its distance and movement, separately for 
each direction, and this information stored in short term memory. This information is then retrieved for use 
in reaching a decision as to whether or not to cross. The procedures involved in actually crossing must then 
be retrieved from long term memory, where it is assumed they have previously been stored. 
Older and Grayson's distinction between time and location selection is a good one as we shall see, but their 
four underlying stages are rather too global to be useful as a means of setting educational objectives. In fact, 
each of these stages could be further subdivided (cf. van der Molen, 1981a) and, in any case, often seem to 
overlap with respect to the psychological processes involved. For example, the authors' distinction between 
perception and judgement is arbitrary and does not accord with distinctions that would follow from any 
identifiable theory of perception or cognition. Moreover, the analysis tends to confound basic psychological 
processes (such as distance perception) with strategic processes (such as the setting of safety margins). This 
distinction is important because a pedestrian might accurately assess the time to arrival of an approaching 
vehicle, yet fail to use this information in a strategically acceptable way - for example, by leaving an 
inadequate safety margin when selecting a traffic gap to walk through. In fact, there are substantial effects of 
age (and possibly also of gender) on the strategies that road users adopt when deploying basic perceptual and 
cognitive skills. A clear distinction should therefore be made between these processes. 
A similar analysis to that of Older and Grayson was made by Avery (1974), except that estimating the speed 
of approaching vehicles was included as a judgmental variable. In addition, this author attempted to review 
the development of these processes on the basis of the literature available at that time. This analysis was 
later extended in an influential paper by Vinje (1981), who reviewed the functional capacities of young 
children in relation to what she considered to be key pedestrian tasks. In addition, she took the significant 
step of relating these capacities to developmental theory, specifically that of Jean Piaget. On the basis of this 
analysis, Vinje listed a series of objectives which she considered viable with children of different ages, 
taking into account the functional capacities that could be assumed in each age group. She also suggested 
some simpler strategies that might be taught to younger children who would not have the capacity to make 
more sophisticated judgements. These proposals were operationalised in a series of important studies at the 
University of Groningen's Traffic Research Centre and now form the basis of much road safety education for 
young children in the Netherlands (e.g., Vinje, 1981; Rothengatter, 1981, 1984; van der Molen, 1981b, 
1983, 1989). 
The argument being made, then, is that pedestrians require a range of fundamental skills in order to interact 
safely with traffic. They must also learn to deploy these skills appropriately through the development of 
suitable strategies, which will necessarily vary from one traffic situation to another. Whilst it is probably not 
possible to provide a definitive taxonomy, in the following section we attempt to specify at least the most 
critical psychological skills that are engaged in pedestrian behaviour. We then review what is known about 
the development of such skills in children of different ages. Finally, we consider from a theoretical point of 
view whether or not it might be possible to promote development in inexperienced children through 
appropriate training. 
1.4 Skill and pedestrian behaviour 
1.41 Detecting the presence of traffic 
Obviously, pedestrians have to look for traffic in the first place if they are to avoid it. Having looked (in the 
sense of pointing their heads in the right direction), they also have to 'see' it. This will depend on the 
effectiveness of a number of underlying processes. For example, an effective visual search strategy will be 
required in order to detect the presence of a vehicle. This in turn will require at least some conceptual 
representation of how cars move about the road environment - otherwise pedestrians would have no idea of 
where to look and where not and their visual search would be poorly structured and inefficient. The 
pedestrian's attention is also clearly involved - that is, their ability to focus on relevant cues whilst ignoring 
irrelevant ones. Since irrelevant objects or events are frequently more interesting than relevant ones, this 
raises the problem of distractibility - a problem of considerable importance in child pedestrian behaviour, as 
we shall see. Additional factors influencing whether or not the pedestrian succeeds in detecting the presence 
of a vehicle will include the accuracy of their auditory localisation, together with their ability to co-ordinate 
auditory and visual information. Pedestrians also have to recognise that certain roadside locations obstruct 
their view of traffic (e.g. when crossing near parked vehicles or similar obstructions, at a bend, on the brow 
of a hill, etc.). Such locations reduce the chances of detecting an approaching vehicle from the outset. We 
can see, then, that even detecting the presence of vehicles depends on a whole series of underlying 
psychological skills. Unless pedestrians develop competence in these they may fall at the first hurdle by 
failing even to detect that a vehicle is present. 
1.42 Visual timing judgements 
Although far more complex than commonly supposed, the judgements referred to above represent no more 
than the first step in the process of crossing even a simple road. Once a vehicle has been detected, a range of 
judgements concerning the vehicle's movement must be made. Firstly, the pedestrian must determine if the 
vehicle is moving at all and, if so, in what direction. If the vehicle is on an approach path, then the time-to-
contact of the vehicle must be determined: that is, the time available before the vehicle reaches the 
pedestrian's projected crossing path. Such timing judgements become particularly important on busier roads 
where it is not possible to wait for traffic to clear, as it sometimes is on quieter roads. These skills depend on 
the observer's sensitivity to a range of optical variables related to time-to-contact. Distance and velocity 
perception would also seem to be implicated, together with the ability to integrate these variables with 
respect to time. Recently, it has been proposed that higher-order variables are also available to specify time-
to-contact in a more direct way. Pedestrians must become attuned to the information afforded by such 
variables and learn how to co-ordinate their movement to them.  
1.43 Co-ordinating information from different directions 
There are few occasions on which a pedestrian is required to deal with a single direction. Normally, 
pedestrians must cope with traffic coming from at least two directions - and from three or four in the case of 
many intersections. This means that information must be picked up separately for each of several directions 
and all the timing and other judgements made in relation to each of them. Thus memory and the ability to 
divide attention between tasks become crucial (the latter throwing up once again the problem of 
distractibility). Finally, the information has to be co-ordinated and processed in real time - and all within a 
rather short period, given the speed with which the road environment can change. This will depend on the 
efficiency of a whole range of central processing functions. The complexity of the road situations that a 
pedestrian can tackle will doubtless reflect both the maturity of these functions and the efficiency of the 
strategies that have been developed for using what are known to be limited resources. 
1.44 Co-ordinating perception and action 
Although the perceptual skills described above are crucial to pedestrians, they would be meaningless if taken 
in isolation. In order to reach a decision as to whether it is possible to cross safely, the pedestrian must relate 
the time available for crossing to the time required. The latter will, of course, vary as a function of road 
width as well as the individual's movement characteristics. In order to anticipate the time needed to cross, 
pedestrians thus need knowledge of their own movement capabilities and must be able to calibrate such 
knowledge to visual information specifying road width. As adults, we are not normally aware of this 
calibration unless it changes, as when one temporarily becomes lame. In the elderly, the calibration may 
gradually change as movement becomes more restricted. Children must learn to calibrate from scratch. In 
addition, they must keep the calibration in tune as they grow. 
1.5 The development of pedestrian-related skills in children 
It can be seen, then, that crossing even a simple road requires competence in a range of primary perceptuo-
motor and cognitive skills. If these are not properly developed, the pedestrian's crossing decisions will 
almost certainly be inadequate. It is therefore vital to know how these skills develop in childhood and what 
level of skill can be expected in children of different ages. Only when baselines have been established in this 
way would we be in a position to consider the implications for education or training. We turn to this 
question in the present section. 
1.51 Looking behaviour 
Notwithstanding the considerable importance attributed to this in road safety education, the evidence 
suggests that children frequently step into the street without looking for traffic. In a recent major study 
involving over 10,000 observations throughout the highly populated Central Belt of Scotland, for instance, 
more than 50% of children in the age range 4-14 were estimated not to have looked for traffic before 
stepping into the road (Scottish Development Department, 1989). Moreover, this represents an average 
figure: younger children were even less likely to look. Similarly, Valavuo (1976) when observing children at 
a fairly busy road found that only a third of 7 and 8 year-olds made head movements in both directions 
before crossing (although this figure increased if traffic was actually approaching). In a long and detailed 
review of the literature, van der Molen (1981b) found that the estimated proportion of children failing to 
look varied somewhat from one study to another but was nearly always substantial, with identifiable age 
trends. 
A similar pattern of findings has been reported in studies of accident victims. For example, Grayson (1975a) 
estimated that 39% of the child victims he interviewed had not looked at all before crossing, a figure also 
supported by the Scottish study whose researchers estimated that 25% of the victims they interviewed had 
'almost certainly' failed to look either way before crossing and a further 12% had 'most likely' failed to do so. 
Other studies have reported evidence of partial looking - for example, in only one direction. A common error 
at junctions is that children fail to look for traffic approaching from behind them. They seem to be 
preoccupied with looking to right and left and fail to realise the importance of checking for vehicles 
approaching from the rear (e.g., van der Molen, 1983). This error occurs even though looking "all round" is 
the instruction taught by the Green Cross Code. The failure is no doubt a partial contributor to the high 
accident rates associated with crossing at junctions in children. 
It might be felt that the way to deal with this is simply to tell children to look more. As we have seen, 
however, the problem is not so simple. The problem is that young children need a much clearer idea of what 
they are supposed to look for. It is not just a question of ensuring they point their heads in the right direction: 
it is a question of being attuned to the information required to make appropriate judgements. What this 
information is, seems far from self-evident to young children and one often has the feeling that they do not 
really understand what they are meant to be doing when told to 'look'. Sometimes they seem to be merely 
going through a kind of ritual that involves turning their heads from side to side. We have seen children 
doing this quite faithfully but at such speed as to have no hope of registering anything.  
Such behaviour illustrates a common tendency of children to apply rules they have been taught in a rather 
blind and rigid manner without proper comprehension of the purpose underlying the rule. Such rigidity is a 
problem not just in road safety education, but in all education. It is especially serious, however, where 
education programmes favour a rule-based approach and where children learn the rules out with the context 
to which the rules apply. We return to this problem in Chapters 2 and 3. In any event, it seems clear that just 
telling a child to 'look' before crossing may have relatively little meaning for small children. Their behaviour 
needs to be far more closely directed than this. 
1.52 Selective attention and visual search 
One likely reason why children do not detect traffic even after 'looking' in the right direction is that their 
attention and visual search strategies are inadequate. The ability to scan the visual field in a systematic way 
and to attend selectively to relevant features are obviously crucial in pedestrian (as in other) behaviour. 
Unfortunately, such processes are not easy to measure since they do not correspond to overt behaviours. 
Pedestrian researchers have therefore tended to restrict themselves to rather inadequate indices, such as 
whether or not the child moved his head. However, several interesting findings allow us to speculate a little 
further on the likely state of these internal processes when children are engaged in 'looking'. In addition, 
there is an extensive theoretical literature on the development of attention and visual search that we examine 
in this section. 
A surprising finding reported in several studies is that accidents quite often happen to victims who did, in 
fact, look before crossing but somehow failed to 'see' the approaching vehicle. For example, in his study of 
child victims, Grayson (1975a) estimated that 31% of them had 'looked but not seen' the striking vehicle. A 
similar conclusion has also been drawn with regard to accidents involving the elderly as many as 70% of 
whom, for one reason or another, appear not to have seen the striking vehicle (TRRL, 1972). These failures 
cannot easily be put down to what the man in the street would call 'eyesight' problems: that is, to acuity or 
other visual defects. A more likely reason is that their visual search was inadequate. In fact, even ordinary 
adults make errors of this type from time to time. Most people have had the experience of looking out for 
cars before crossing the road only to find themselves stepping out under the wheels of a bicycle! Somehow, 
the fact of being primed for cars can make us blind to other vehicles, including ones that are perfectly 
'visible'. Such errors, probably attentional in origin, are known as 'cognitive failures' (Reason, 1990) and 
seem to be uncomfortably common. Certainly, most people have little difficulty in finding examples in their 
own experience. In children who have not yet developed the skills, such errors can be expected to be much 
less the exception than the rule. 
Laboratory studies of children's attention and visual search are certainly consistent with this view. Studies of 
children's eye movements as they visually explore objects or scenes show that these are inefficient and 
unstructured by comparison to adults or older children. Similarly, when asked to scan pictures or text for 
particular cues, they take much longer than adults to find them and make more mistakes. For example, in a 
key study Vurpillot (1968) examined the visual fixations of children between 3 and 9 years while engaged in 
a complex discrimination task. A systematic scanning pattern did not appear until around the age of 5, 
becoming more widely deployed in children over the age of 6 years. Younger children carried out only 
partial search and their discriminations were thus made on the basis of limited information. Similarly, 
Zinchenko, Van Chizti-tsi and Tarakanov (1965) reported age-related differences when children between 3 
and 6 years of age were asked to inspect an irregular shape which they were told they would later have to 
identify. The eye movements of a second group of children were photographed during the later recognition 
phase. In the inspection phase, younger children tended to fixate on the centre of the figure whereas older 
children looked almost exclusively along the contours (i.e. at the most informative parts of the figure). 
Interestingly, the younger children looked at the contours more during the recognition phase although, in the 
absence of such movements during inspection, much of the critical information would presumably have been 
missed. 
Such findings are consistent with the theory of perceptual learning proposed by Gibson (1969), according to 
which "...what is learned can be described as the detection of properties, patterns and distinctive features" 
(1969, pg. 77). According to Gibsonian theory, perceptual learning is a process by which the child becomes 
increasingly tuned to optical information specifying properties of the environment and thus becomes 
increasingly capable of differentiating between similar stimuli (Gibson, 1966). For example, Gibson and 
Gibson (1955) asked children aged between 6 and 11 and adults to identify a standard four-coil scribble in a 
pack of cards containing both the target scribble and a range of variants. Younger children made more 
errors, especially as the number of distinctive features shared by the target scribble and its comparison 
increased. 
The notion that as children grow older they become increasingly sensitive to the distinctive features of 
stimuli and less dominated by the global attributes is supported by a programme of research by Nodine and 
his colleagues. For example, Nodine and Steurle (1973) measured the eye movements of kindergarten, first 
and third graders (presumably between the ages of 4 and 7 years) when looking at enlarged letters. They 
found that as age increased there was an increasing focus on distinctive features and on the number of such 
features examined. These findings point to a more strategic pattern of search in older children, with attention 
being increasingly focussed on features that are task-relevant and less on those that are merely interesting or 
attractive. 
This shift from unsystematic to actively organised search is a central feature of development and has been 
well documented in numerous studies as diverse as haptic exploration (e.g., Abravanel, 1968; Klein, 1963; 
Piaget and Inhelder, 1956), selective listening (e.g., Doyle, 1973; Maccoby and Konrad, 1966), and selecting 
cues from a perceptual array (e.g., Pick and Frankel, 1973; Smith, Kemler and Aronfreed, 1975). According 
to Wright and Vliestra (1975), young children explore the environment in a spontaneous and playful manner, 
with their attention driven by the salience of surrounding stimuli rather than by logical features of the task at 
hand. As they mature, there is a shift towards increasingly organised and active search in which attention 
becomes more intentional and goal directed and therefore more governed by information relating to the 
demands of the task. The child thus concentrates more on relevant features, filtering out those that are 
irrelevant. This shift starts to take place relatively early and is quite apparent by the time children have 
reached six years of age. However, there is a transitional period between the ages of 6 and 9 when salient 
features continue to capture the child's attention. When these are distracting or irrelevant they can be a major 
source of interference to the child, forcing them back into the earlier, exploratory search mode (e.g., 
DeMarie-Dreblow and Miller, 1988; Miller, Haynes, DeMarie-Dreblow and Woody-Ramsey, 1986). Wright 
and Vliestra go on to suggest that these differences in the nature of information-processing are what underlie 
the concept of impulsiveness and that the distinction sometimes proposed between impulsive and reflective 
children (e.g., Messer, 1976) mirrors corresponding differences in cognitive style. 
Which stimuli children find most salient and whether this remains consistent across a particular age group is 
not entirely clear. Some writers have suggested that colour is a dominating perceptual dimension amongst 3-
4 year-olds, who focus on it in preference to other stimulus attributes, whereas around the age of 5 a 
preference emerges for form (Corah, 1964; Suchman and Trabasso, 1966a,b). This developmental shift may 
be formally related to the shift from exploration to search since colour presents itself in dense, global blocks 
whereas form involves attending to contours and edges. Corresponding findings have been found in the 
haptic mode where younger children focus on information about texture at the expense of information about 
shape (e.g., Gliner, Pick, Pick and Hales, 1969). Similar preferences have been found in studies of spatial 
orientation. For example, 5 year-olds tend to code the position of objects in terms of their location relative to 
external landmarks. Older children and adults, on the other hand, often use an action-based framework for 
defining spatial positions: for example, an object's position in space might be defined by the number of 
paces needed to reach it, or the time that would be required to do so (e.g., Thomson, 1980,1983; Tagg, 1990; 
Thomson and Tagg, 1992). This developing focus on perception-action relationships has implications for the 
sorts of information that children of different ages can be expected to centre on at the roadside and for the 
kinds of judgements they will spontaneously make. The development of these perception-action 
relationships certainly merits further study. 
Consistent with the view that children focus on some attributes at the expense of others, we have found that 
when asked to memorise the location of targets in a room, 5 and 7 year-olds often become preoccupied by 
the nature of the targets themselves and seem to have difficulty in ignoring these attributes in favour of the 
spatial ones (Tagg, 1990). This effect was sufficiently marked that Tagg found it necessary to replace the 
original targets (brightly coloured images of animals) with plain, mundane ones. Only in this way could she 
focus the children's attention on the relevant spatial variables and divert their attention away from the highly 
salient but irrelevant target attributes. Similarly, in observing the strategies used in learning a route through 
their neighbourhood, Allen, Kirasovic, Siegel and Herman (1979) found that older children and adults make 
effective use of landmarks, especially in 'marking' critical points on the route such as corners where a change 
of direction is necessary. Younger children also remembered landmarks but, unlike older subjects, these 
were seldom of much use in coding the route. Instead, the landmarks that young children remembered were 
all high impact ones like colourful window boxes or a cat sitting by a bright door. Thus, young children 
remember stimuli in an incidental way, based on their intrinsic attractiveness, rather than focussing 
strategically on stimuli that are functional as landmarks and help in memorising the route. It seems likely 
that children will be attracted by many different kinds of stimuli that they encounter in the natural 
environment and these will remain an important source of distraction until such time as the child's attention 
becomes directed more by the logic of the task rather than by the salience of incidental cues. 
Finally, once children have started to develop systematic attentional strategies, it appears that the effort 
required to direct their attention in this way may be so great for the transitional child that it interferes with 
other aspects of the task. For example, DeMarie-Dreblow and Miller (1988) employed a task in which 
children had to remember relevant versus irrelevant items hidden behind doors. When children were 
required to open the doors, recall was better amongst 9 year-olds than 7 year-olds. However, when an 
experimenter opened the doors on the child's behalf, this difference disappeared. The interpretation is that 
the effort of implementing a systematic strategy of door opening placed such a demand on the younger 
children that it interfered with the recall aspect of the task. Thus, although capable of producing a reasonably 
organised search strategy, the children were unable to capitalise on this when an additional task was 
introduced (Guttentag, 1984; Bjorklund and Harnishfeger, 1987). 
The importance of visual search and attentional control in pedestrian behaviour is obvious and, given the 
developmental trends, would seem to be an area deserving of far more investigation than it has received up 
to now. There is also no doubt that distractibility is one of the most important features of child behaviour 
and seems to be associated with a large proportion of accidents. For example, one of the commonest 
accidents occurs when a child dashes out into the street, often in the vicinity of parked cars or other 
obstructions. Van der Linden and Goos (1975) estimate that 70% of child accidents in Holland are of this 
type. Such behaviour does not seem to happen purely at random. Dashouts often seem to occur when the 
child becomes distracted by something, often of a social or emotional nature, such as the appearance of a 
friend on the other side of the street or the arrival of an ice-cream van. Sandels (1974) estimates that factors 
of this kind are involved in up to 50% of the accidents to children under the age of ten. These observations 
are certainly consistent with the view that distractibility and impulsiveness may be associated with young 
children's susceptibility to interference from salient but irrelevant cues. If correct, this would suggest that 
impulsiveness may not be a completely fixed and inevitable feature of the young child's personality (as is 
often assumed) but may instead reflect undeveloped visual search strategies and immature attentional 
control. This raises the possibility that such skills might be amenable to training. We return to this in 
Chapter 2. 
1.53 Visual timing 
Clearly, this is one of the most important of all road crossing skills. Every pedestrian must learn to estimate 
accurately the time that will elapse before an approaching vehicle arrives at their intended crossing point. 
They must also learn to relate the time that is available for crossing to the time that is required to do so. The 
latter will vary according to the pedestrian's walking speed and other aspects of their locomotion, and to the 
width of the road. Such timing skills are of less importance on quiet roads where a pedestrian might simply 
wait for the road to clear before crossing. On busier roads, however, this is often not feasible. To cope 
successfully with modern traffic, it is essential that pedestrians learn to identify gaps in the traffic flow that 
are safe to pass through and differentiate them from those that are not. Observational studies of pedestrians 
in traffic suggest that such skills are well developed in adults and even young teenagers (e.g., Routledge, 
Howarth and Repetto-Wright, 1976; van der Molen, 1981; McLaren, 1993). In children, on the other hand, 
they are not (Routledge et al., 1976; Lee, Young and McLaughlin, 1984). 
It is normally assumed that such judgements depend on distance and velocity perception together with the 
ability to integrate these variables with respect to time. The accuracy of both distance and velocity 
perception appears to vary as a function of age (Zeigler and Leibowitz, 1957; Salvatore, 1974) and when 
asked to use these skills to make judgements about the safety of gaps in traffic, children make many errors 
compared to adults (Hoffman, Payne and Prescott, 1980; Lee et al., 1984; van Schagen, 1988). Not until 
about 11 years of age does the accuracy of such judgements approach that seen in adults. Moreover, many 
authors have stressed the difficulty that younger children have in integrating such information to make 
temporal or duration judgements. For example, where distance and velocity have to be integrated, children 
tend to focus on one variable at the expense of the other and the resulting judgement is thus erroneous 
(Piaget, 1969). This effect has been found in many of the classic Piagetian reasoning tasks and is usually 
explained in terms of the characteristics of pre-operational thinking as expressed in Piaget's general theory of 
development (e.g., Piaget, 1955a). These characteristics are further discussed in Chapter 3. The effect has 
frequently been assumed to depend on maturational factors over which education can have little or no 
control, with competence appearing around 9 years of age. This has often been thought to pose a barrier to 
the kinds of judgement that can be expected in younger children and to limit what road safety should attempt 
to teach at this age (Sandels, 1975; Vinje, 1981).  
However, whilst recognising that younger children are indeed limited in their timing judgements, numerous 
writers have found evidence of more sophisticated reasoning in pre-operational children when the problems 
have been set up in other ways (e.g., Berndt and Wood,1974; Levin, 1979; Wilkening, 1981; Ross, 1993). 
For example, Berndt and Wood (1974) and Levin (1979) attribute at least part of the difficulty to attentional 
problems caused by the fact that children find some cues more salient than others. This, of course, has 
already been discussed in the previous section. It must also be borne in mind that the studies discussed in the 
present section are all concerned with the child's conception of the relationship between variables such as 
distance, velocity and time. However, there is no simple relation between the child's conception of time and 
duration and the perceptuo-motor judgements they make in the world. For example, it is by no means 
obvious that the ability to catch a ball depends on the catcher's ability to explain the relationship between 
distance and velocity or, for that matter, any other variables. Indeed, extremely fine visuo-motor timing is 
typical of the behaviour of most species - including relatively primitive ones such as flies, spiders and honey 
bees - none of whom will ever attain the stage of concrete operational thinking. No species other than 
humans do this, yet this does not stop them making the most delicate timing judgements hundreds of times a 
day. Not surprisingly, children also demonstrate fine examples of such timing long before concrete 
operational thought has developed, and in activities such as gymnastics, dance or music they occasionally 
reach standards higher than can be achieved by most adults. It is thus almost certainly a serious error to 
assume that basic perceptuo-motor judgements depend on higher conceptual development, a point of view 
forcefully put by a number of influential theorists (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Michaels and Carrello, 1981; Gibson, 
1988; Demetre, Lee, Pitcairn, Grieve, Thomson and Ampofo-Boateng, 1992). This does not mean to say that 
age differences with regard to such skills do not exist. However, it is not consistent with the view that 
children are biologically incapable of learning them until concrete operational thought has appeared. This 
means that younger children may be able to learn such skills, given appropriate training.  
This point of view is strongly supported by recent evidence that time-to-contact information is, in any case, 
directly specified in the optic array at the eye and does not have to be deduced from lower-order variables 
like distance and velocity in the first place. In a series of important papers, Lee and his colleagues have 
shown that time-to-contact is specified by the inverse of the rate of dilation of an approaching object's 
projection on the retina and that this information is independent of information about distance or velocity: 
that is, time-to-contact is specified directly (see Lee, 1976, 1980 and Lee, Young, Reddish, Lough and 
Clayton, 1983 for the theory on optical timing). Sensitivity to this variable has been demonstrated 
empirically in studies where distance information has been eliminated but where accurate timing judgements 
were nevertheless made (e.g., Schiff and Detwiler, 1979; Todd, 1981). The discovery has had a profound 
effect on visual science and an extensive literature has now confirmed the importance of this optical variable 
(known as t) in controlling timing judgements. Examples of real-world activities in which t has been shown 
to play a decisive role include running, ski jumping, long jumping, and hitting and catching in a variety of 
skilled tasks such as table tennis, cricket and baseball (see Valenti and Pittenger (1993) for a range of 
articles on this theme). It also seems to control timing behaviour in many other species, including birds (e.g., 
Lee and Reddish, 1981) and insects (e.g. Wagner, 1982). In humans, timing judgements improve over a long 
period of time, finally flattening out in the early teenage years (Williams, 1983). However, they are seen in 
remarkably mature form as early as a few weeks from birth (von Hofsten, 1982, 1983). Students of motor 
behaviour normally attribute the improvements that are seen as the child grows older to improved 
deployment of timing information - that is, to better perceptuo-motor coordination - rather than to 
improvements in visual judgement per se (e.g., Gabbard, 1992). Again, this suggests that such abilities may 
be amenable to training, given appropriate methods. We examine studies which have attempted to do this in 
Chapter 2. 
1.54 Perception of dangerous locations 
Perhaps an even more critical ability than the one discussed in the previous section is the ability to identify 
locations or situations on the road that are intrinsically dangerous and where crossing should not be 
attempted (or where a special strategy is needed). The Green Cross Code, or even the much more 
sophisticated timing skills described above, are of little value if the child considers it safe to put them into 
practice on the brow of a hill, for instance. Other features that are intrinsically dangerous include parked 
cars; locations where the road is obscured by hedges, bushes, or other street 'furniture'; sharp bends; and a 
variety of junctions and intersections. The features that such sites have in common is either that they obscure 
the child's view of traffic (and drivers' view of them); or they involve complex traffic movements which tax 
the child's visual search and information-processing capacities. Moreover, such sites seem to be over-
represented in child accident statistics, suggesting that there may indeed be a causal link (ONSER, 1982; 
Ampofo-Boateng, 1987; Assailly, 1992). 
Whether appropriate action is taken when confronted with such situations will obviously depend on whether 
or not the pedestrian recognises the intrinsic threat posed by them in the first place. However, current 
countermeasures do not take this problem seriously, scarcely recognising it as a problem at all. In fact, the 
Green Cross Code simply instructs children to "first find a safe place", which assumes that they know how 
to do so. Moreover, as previously noted, when questioned about priorities in safety education, parents, 
teachers, road safety experts and the police all relegated finding a safe site to a secondary level of 
importance (Foot et al., 1982). But can children, in fact, find safe places to cross the road? Do they even 
recognise dangerous sites when they see them? If not, the crossing skills that are the main focus of attention 
in most current road safety education will be largely undermined. 
It turns out that young children show very little ability to recognise what is dangerous about such sites and 
will readily choose to cross there if given the opportunity to do so. In a series of experiments designed to 
examine children's reasoning in such situations, Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson (1991) found that children 
under 9 years of age tend to focus on a single factor in making such judgements. If the children can see a car 
anywhere in the vicinity, they judge the site to be dangerous. On the other hand if no cars can be seen, they 
judge the location to be safe. Thus, locations that completely obscure the child's view of the road are 
frequently regarded as safe. Younger children completely fail to realise that such sites are dangerous 
precisely because no cars can be seen. Only from about 9 years of age do children begin to appreciate that 
the brow of a hill or an obscured bend with overhanging trees and bushes is a dangerous place to cross the 
road. 
Our impression in these studies was that the children were relying on a rule they had been taught, namely 
'don't cross if you can see any cars coming'. If none was visible, they simply assumed that none was present. 
This would seem to be another example of the inflexible way in which young children tend to behave 
following rule-based approaches to teaching. Only older children spotted the danger of such situations and 
suggested solutions such as moving to a clearer position nearby. These findings suggest that young children 
under the age of 9 years must often be at considerable risk on the road. They certainly should be taught how 
to make such judgements, and at an early stage given how basic they are in pedestrian behaviour. We review 
attempts that have been made to do this in the next chapter. 
1.55 Information processing 
Information processing is, of course, implicit in most of the judgements that have already been discussed in 
earlier sections. However, several further aspects of information processing should be briefly discussed at 
this stage. These concern central processing capacity and divided attention; short term memory; and speed of 
information processing. 
The problem of attention has already been discussed in considerable detail but further comment is merited in 
relation to the problem of divided attention. This term refers to the ability to perform two tasks at the same 
time, such as driving and talking; or listening to music whilst writing an essay. Many studies have examined 
our ability to perform tasks simultaneously and have investigated how performance changes with experience 
(see Keogh and Sugden, 1985 for a review). Since attention and central processing capacity are limited, the 
process is essentially one of learning how to allocate limited resources to the different tasks as efficiently as 
possible so that both can be performed to some criterion of adequacy. Very often, subjects spontaneously 
define one task as primary and the other secondary and distribute their resources accordingly. In the early 
stages of learning, however, dividing attention in this way is extremely difficult and subjects often find it 
hard to keep both tasks going. They also suffer interference between the tasks and make many errors. A 
good everyday example of these difficulties that most people have experienced is the early stages of learning 
to drive. 
Developmental studies show clear age trends with regard to the ability to divide attention, with older 
children performing better than younger ones on a range of dual tasks (e.g., Guttentag, 1984; Wickens and 
Bendel, 1982). The improvement with age does not seem to result from structural changes in the underlying 
capacities, however. Rather, the child - like the inexperienced adult - learns to use his limited resources more 
efficiently. With experience, the skills become increasingly automated and thus less of a burden is placed on 
central processing. Subjects also develop strategies which allow them to distribute their attention more 
effectively during execution of the tasks. The same point is generally agreed in relation to memory and 
information processing capacities. Whilst short-term memory does appear to increase between 3 and 7 years 
of age, this seems to reflect the relatively inefficient way in which younger children encode information 
rather than the absolute size of the store (Gabbard, 1992). Similarly, speed of information processing as 
measured by reaction time improves markedly with age. For example, Surwillo (1977) estimates that a 5 
year-old takes as much as five times as long to process one 'bit' of information as a 17 year-old, with most 
improvement taking place between the ages of 6 and 12 years. Again this implies that, as children grow 
older, they become more efficient at picking up relevant information, making decisions on the basis of it, 
and organising appropriate behavioural responses. Since the major limiting factors again appear to be 
strategic rather than structural, this suggests that appropriate training might reasonably be expected to have a 
facilitative effect on the development of such functions.  
1.6 Can road skills be trained? 
In this chapter we have argued that pedestrians require competence in a range of basic psychological skills 
and must learn how to deploy these strategically at the roadside. Developmental trends exist with respect to 
almost all these functions, with children generally approaching adult levels of performance around 11-12 
years of age (though development may continue up until the early twenties in some cases). The critical 
question is, can we promote development of these skills in younger children through appropriate educational 
intervention? And can children learn to deploy the skills which they do possess in a strategic way, if they are 
given appropriate experience? 
1.7 Characteristics of the pre-operational child 
The answer that road safety has generally given to these questions is no. At best, it has been argued that 
children are severely constrained in what they can learn until an appropriate stage of psychological 
development has been reached. This point of view is particularly associated with the work of Sandels 
(1975), whose extensive and influential pioneering work on child pedestrian behaviour in Sweden led her to 
the conclusion that "... it is not possible to adapt fully young children (under 10 years) to the traffic 
environment. They are biologically incapable of managing its many demands" (Sandels,1975). So strongly 
did Sandels feel about the issue that she suggested efforts should be directed primarily at separating children 
from traffic altogether. Children's biological limitations were also stressed by Vinje (1981), though she 
expressed considerably more optimism about what could be achieved through education and training. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis was on adapting strategies to the limited skills that could be expected in young 
children. There was no consideration that the underlying skills might themselves be amenable to training. 
This outlook stems directly from a common interpretation of the Piagetian theory of development (e.g., 
Piaget, 1955a). In this powerful and influential theory, Piaget stressed that development proceeds by way of 
four main stages. The second or 'pre-operational' stage, occurring between the ages of 2 and 7 years, is of 
particular relevance to road safety education. In this stage, Piaget claimed that the child's thinking is at first 
very concrete, bound to the immediate present, and strongly centred on single aspects of experience in a 
rather rigid way. As a result, children have difficulty with tasks where the integration of two or more 
variables is required. In these cases, the pre-operational child typically fixates on one aspect of immediate 
experience at the expense of others. Examples of this mode of thought can be seen in Piaget's classic 
'conservation task' experiments. For instance, water might be poured from a tall, thin container into a short, 
fat one and the children asked if there is more, less or the same amount of water as before. Older children 
realise that volume is a function of both the height and the width of the containers and correctly reply that 
the amount of water is conserved. Younger children, on the other hand, fixate on one variable and ignore its 
relation to the other. As a result, they incorrectly argue that the amount of liquid changes when it is poured 
from one vessel into the other. The same finding can be seen in many other tasks where it is necessary to 
combine variables in this way. An example that is particularly relevant in the present context is the 
judgement of which of two trains travelling at different speeds and over different distances will arrive at a 
certain point first (Piaget, 1969). According to Piaget, children are unable to differentiate time and space 
until the age of 8-9 years and so make many errors on such tasks. As in the previous example, they tend to 
fixate on a single cue when making such judgements and thus make incorrect time-to-arrival judgements. 
The implication for road crossing is obvious. This basic effect, known as centration, is linked to a closely-
related effect known as egocentricity, in which children find difficulty in adopting the perspective of another 
person, both literally and metaphorically. As in the conservation tasks, pre-operational children tend to fixate 
on their own point of view, typically attributing to other observers the same view of an object or scene as 
they themselves enjoy. This has been invoked to suggest that children may think that drivers can see them 
whenever they can see the driver. If correct, such findings would have important implications for road safety 
education and for what kinds of judgements could be expected of children under the age of 8 - 9 years. 
Moreover, since Piagetian theory is often considered (erroneously) to be fundamentally maturational in 
character, it has frequently been assumed that development depends largely on the passage of time. This 
would mean that little, if any, acceleration could be expected as a result of education or training and all we 
can do is protect children "until childhood has been matured out of them" (Sandels, 1975). In general, this is 
held to occur around 9 years of age (Sandels, 1975; Vinje, 1981). 
We take up this problem in detail in Chapter 3, but it is worthwhile to briefly consider the merits of the 
position at this stage. As we shall see, developmentalists are now considerably less convinced about the 
inflexibility of the Piagetian stages than some earlier writers appear to have been. Indeed, a large amount of 
research over the past 10 to 15 years has comprehensively demonstrated that children can frequently learn to 
solve problems ahead of the supposedly 'correct' developmental stage - and sometimes far in advance of it. 
Whether or not this happens depends on numerous factors associated with the language and methodology 
used and the precise way in which the task is set up (see, for example, Donaldson, 1978). The situation thus 
seems far from as inflexible as has often been assumed. 
In addition, there has recently been an upsurge of interest in empirical investigations aimed at accelerating 
such development, including studies conducted in the context of road safety. For example, roadside training 
programmes aimed at improving visual timing skills have been undertaken with children as young as 5 years 
of age with extremely encouraging results (e.g., Lee et al., 1984; Young and Lee, 1987; Van Schagen, 1988; 
Demetre et al., 1992; Demetre, Lee, Grieve, Pitcairn, Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson, 1993). Similarly, the 
effectiveness of training in improving the ability of 5 year-olds to find safe places to cross the road has been 
demonstrated in recent studies by Thomson, Ampofo-Boateng, Pitcairn, Grieve, Lee and Demetre (1992); 
Thomson (1993); Tucker (1993); and Ampofo-Boateng, Thomson, Grieve, Pitcairn, Lee and Demetre 
(1993). Even studies aimed at reducing children's vulnerability to distraction and impulsive behaviour have 
been undertaken with encouraging results (Limbourg and Gerber, 1978). We review these studies in detail in 
the next chapter. However, enough has been said to suggest that the broad sweep of psychological research 
is inconsistent with the simplistic view that development is constrained to follow a fixed path and is not 
amenable to intervention through educational means. 
1.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have argued that children need a range of fundamental psychological skills in order to 
interact with traffic, together with the ability to deploy these strategically in different traffic situations. We 
have argued that viable objectives in road safety education would be to define operationally such skills and 
strategies and devise appropriate training procedures whereby they might be improved. If successful, such 
training would yield direct and measurable changes in children's actual behaviour in traffic, not merely 
changes in what they can say about traffic when questioned by adults. Whilst a long-established tradition in 
road safety asserts that many of these skills cannot be improved through education until a particular stage of 
development has been reached, we challenge that view and argue that it is inconsistent with modern research 
in psychology or, indeed, with the majority view among developmental psychologists. In addition, recent 
studies that have attempted to improve children's performance on a range of clearly-defined pedestrian skills 
have produced empirical evidence that such skills can be accelerated, providing appropriate training is 
given. We now go on to examine these issues in some detail. In Chapter 2 we examine the aims and methods 
of current educational provision, commenting on the effectiveness of the different approaches that have been 
attempted. In Chapter 3 we analyse theories of child development, searching for a sound base from which 
educational approaches might emerge, and attempting to account for the relative effectiveness or otherwise 
of the different approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. Finally, in Chapter 4 we examine approaches that we 
believe have particular merit in the effort to devise effective training programmes and should help children 
develop traffic skills and strategies in a progressive and theoretically meaningful way.  
Chapter 2 
Current methods in road safety education 
In the last chapter, we outlined a range of skills that are required to interact safely with traffic. We also 
stressed that pedestrians must learn to deploy these skills efficiently at the roadside. In this chapter, we 
examine the extent to which such skills are in fact taken into account by current road safety education. We 
also assess what the content of current programmes typically is. In addition, we review the methods by 
which road safety education is taught. It is important that these issues should not be confused. If a 
programme fails, it may be that the content of the programme was inappropriate to bring about the desired 
changes in the child. However, it might also be that the method selected for doing so was inappropriate. It is 
thus extremely important to distinguish these factors as far as possible in assessing the effectiveness of any 
road safety technique. 
2.1 Road safety education - current provision 
In combating road accidents most countries have some kind of national scheme, often one that is integrated 
into the school curriculum. Additional programmes might also be introduced at a more local level as the 
authorities in different regions attempt to improve on the available materials or deal with problems that 
particularly affect pedestrians in their own area. Such schemes vary quite widely with respect to the methods 
they employ but are much more unified when it comes to programme content. In the vast majority of cases, 
the aim is to provide children with broadly conceptual knowledge about the traffic environment and instil 
suitable attitudes towards safety. The rationale behind this approach is seldom, if ever, explicitly stated. 
However the assumption seems to be that if children first develop a general conceptual and attitudinal 
framework, then they will be better able to generalise to the diversity of real traffic situations than they 
would if training were to focus on more specific situations. The approach is thus a 'top-down' one, in which 
learning is assumed to proceed from the general to the specific. In fact, this view contradicts virtually every 
theory of learning and development, all of which agree that learning typically progresses in the converse 
direction: that is, from specific, concrete situations to the gradual elaboration of abstract conceptual 
knowledge. We discuss this issue in detail in Chapter 3. However, it is worth noting at the outset that there 
are likely to be problems with any approach that starts from such erroneous assumptions. 
In addition to the acquisition of knowledge and appropriate attitudes to safety, a central aim of road safety 
education in the UK is to teach the Green Cross Code. The Code was introduced in 1971 and was conceived 
as a simple, general-purpose strategy that children could learn without too much difficulty and that would be 
applicable to a wide variety of road crossing situations. In fact, it quickly became apparent that the Code was 
rather too difficult for younger children to learn, and so a simpler version (Stop, Look, Listen, Think) was 
introduced for use with the under 7s. The Green Cross Code has long held a pre-eminent position in British 
road safety education and, in fact, much road safety material takes the teaching of the Code as its primary 
goal. 
In spite of their manifest importance in pedestrian behaviour, no effort has been made in the UK to teach any 
of the skills that were discussed in Chapter 1. Indeed, there seems to be little recognition of the 
sophistication of the skills that are needed to interact with traffic (Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson, 1990; 
Thomson, 1991). Nor is any serious attempt made to increase the child's strategic competence as their 
experience and exposure to traffic changes, though this has long been advocated (e.g., Sheppard, 1975; 
Vinje, 1981). Instead, the Green Cross Code is typically regarded, even by experienced pedestrians, as a sort 
of universal 'golden rule' that is assumed to apply to most, if not all, road crossing situations. It is seldom 
recognised that the Code is an elementary strategy that becomes unsuitable when more complex traffic 
situations are encountered. As a result, even adults tend assume that the Code is the 'right' way to cross - in 
spite of the fact that adults invariably develop quite different strategies for interacting with traffic and 
seldom behave in accordance with the precepts of the Green Cross Code (Thomson, 1991).  
Numerous methods of teaching this material have been attempted but, in practice, the vast bulk of road 
safety education takes place in the classroom. The material is almost exclusively verbal: that is, children 
learn by being told what to do rather than by actually doing anything. The approach is thus almost entirely 
centred on the acquisition of knowledge and the development of appropriate attitudes rather than tackling 
behaviour directly. Despite an OECD review (OECD, 1978) recommending the development of practical 
training methods, there is relatively little practical training in the UK at the present time. Similarly, little 
attempt is made to provide children with guided roadside experience, although recent efforts have been 
made to establish a national traffic club in which children would receive roadside training from their parents 
(e.g., Downing, 1981; Bryan-Brown, 1993; West, Sammons and West, 1993). 
2.2 Techniques of road safety education 
One useful way of classifying techniques for ease of assessment is according to how closely they simulate 
real traffic experiences (Rothengatter, 1981a). After all, we might well imagine that the closer the education 
process can stick to the real thing the better. Techniques, in fact, vary from those that take place in the 
natural traffic environment; to semi-natural simulations, for example in blocked off streets with no traffic; to 
traffic parks or gardens where a lesser degree of realism is maintained; to much more abstract mock-ups in 
the school gym or playground. Finally, teaching might take place in the classroom, in which case there 
would be no element of realism at all (although slides, films or other devices can be rather effective in 
illustrating traffic situations).  
In fact, most traffic education in this country takes place in the classroom through verbal means and training 
by any of the former methods would be unusual. At best, children might receive some simple instruction in 
the playground (for example, they might go through the motions of the Green Cross Code with lines on the 
ground serving to mark the kerb and road; or a simple pedestrian crossing might be simulated). More 
elaborate set-ups are few and far between (although they have been common enough in other areas of traffic 
education, such as cycle training). Evaluating the potential of classroom teaching is therefore of some 
importance. 
2.21 Classroom techniques 
Making general statements about the effectiveness of classroom teaching is complicated by the variety of 
activities that can constitute classroom teaching. However, there is general agreement that, in spite of 
widespread use, classroom instruction by purely verbal means is a poor way to teach road safety and is 
certainly inferior to most other methods. At best, such teaching may improve children's knowledge about 
road safety. Unfortunately, such knowledge does not seem to generalise to behaviour in the traffic 
environment. Numerous studies have reported a failure of transfer from knowledge to behaviour in this way 
and few have provided evidence of success (see Rothengatter (1981) and Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson 
(1990) for reviews). Indeed, children whose performance in traffic is very poor have sometimes been shown 
to exhibit rather good knowledge about road safety (Ryhammer and Berglund, 1980). This lack of 
correspondence between knowledge and behaviour is the single most serious criticism of classroom teaching 
as a whole. Even worse, the results of such instruction can actually have negative effects, because the 
increased knowledge that children exhibit when asked questions about road safety can create the false 
impression that their ability to face the road environment is improving. If this is not the case, then a 
dangerously misleading attribution may be made that the child's competence has increased when, in fact, it 
has not. This point illustrates the crucial importance of validating knowledge acquisition against behavioural 
change and illustrates very clearly the validity problem discussed in Chapter 1. Unhappily, there appears to 
be a widespread assumption that improved knowledge will - almost self-evidently - result in better 
performance on the road. There appear to be no grounds for this assumption. At the very least, verbal 
methods need to be supplemented by other material in order to have a hope of success (e.g., Rothengatter, 
1987). This effectively undermines much of the everyday road safety education that children receive. 
Verbal methods, then, are only likely to work where they focus firmly on the behaviour that the child needs 
to adopt. Even here, there is likely to be considerable difficulty for two reasons. Firstly, the language and 
concepts used may be beyond the understanding of young children, even if they seem perfectly 
straightforward to adults. For instance, in investigating the words and concepts contained in the materials 
used to teach road safety in Dutch schools, Groos (1977) and Meyer and Vinje (1978) found that such 
commonly- used words as "pedestrian" or "pavement" were frequently not understood by young children. 
Simple concepts often referred to in road safety such as "left and right" or "being careful" were also 
frequently misunderstood. Such problems are commonly experienced by the designers of road safety 
packages. For example, in designing the Green Cross Code, considerable effort had to be made to produce a 
wording that would be comprehensible to young children (Sargent and Sheppard, 1974). Moreover, 
continuing concern has been expressed about the ability of younger children to understand even the final 
version. Sheppard (1975) found that nearly a third of the words in the Code were incorrectly read or not read 
at all by 20% of children tested in a follow-up study. So serious was the problem with younger children that 
a greatly simplified code (Stop, Look, Listen, Think) was produced for children under 7 years. Note that this 
does not necessarily reflect what young children are or are not capable of learning: it reflects what they can 
learn by verbal means. We examine below what they can learn when methods that are less dependent on 
verbal competence are employed. 
More important than misunderstanding of individual words, verbal instructions are often far too general to 
transfer to children's behaviour. The example of "being careful" given above is a case in point: what 
behaviour exactly constitutes "being careful"? Another instruction frequently given to children is to look 
before crossing the road. But as we saw in Chapter 1, this is also vague: the child needs to know much more 
precisely what to look for and also needs a clear idea as to what they should do on the basis of what is seen. 
Thus a second major problem with verbal rules or procedures is that young children frequently have 
difficulty in determining from verbal instructions what appropriate behaviour would be. The effect is far 
more marked when instructions are given out of context. In Chapter 1, we gave examples of such 
inappropriate application of verbal rules to roadside judgements. Sometimes, children seem to be merely 
reciting the rules they have learned, almost as a talisman for warding off danger (Preston, 1980). These 
problems of context are well known amongst developmental psychologists and are known to be a problem 
when developing educational materials. Unfortunately, this evidence has so far had little impact in road 
safety. 
These points raise fundamental questions about how effective any purely verbal educational method can be, 
particularly when used in settings where the language is not solidly secured to the objects or behaviour to 
which it refers. One can only speculate about the effectiveness or otherwise of the much more open-ended 
verbal instruction given by police officers or RSTOs (RSOs) during their visits to the classroom. Verbal 
instruction when used in isolation and without the very clearest understanding of the child's conceptual and 
language difficulties, then, would seem to be at best a hazardous technique, particularly with children whose 
familiarity with traffic is at the most elementary level. It would seem that verbal instruction needs to be 
supplemented by something considerably more concrete if road crossing skills are to be learned. 
2.22 Books and other printed materials 
By far the most widely used supplement to verbal instructional methods are books, posters and other printed 
matter. Although such materials are seldom evaluated at all (Gerber, Huber and Limbourg, 1977), such 
evidence as there is suggests that they are not particularly effective, at least on their own. Once again it 
appears that while such material may increase children's knowledge, this does not readily transfer to their 
behaviour (Schioldborg, 1976). In fact, most of the evaluation work that has been undertaken with these 
materials is process rather than outcome evaluation. The concern is thus with establishing that the material 
can be understood by the children, that they find it interesting, that it has face validity for the professionals 
involved, and so on -- rather than with whether the child's roadside behaviour changes as a result of using it. 
Process evaluation is certainly important, as numerous studies show. For example, Colborne and Sheppard 
(1966) examined the extent to which children between the ages of 5 and 7 understood the message in a 
poster designed to discourage them from rushing into the street. It was found that the vast majority of 5 year-
olds failed to grasp the message and only about half of 7 year-olds did. When the poster was broken up into 
a sequence of pictures, however, the message was much better understood by both age groups. Firth (1973), 
investigating posters made by the Tufty Club, examined the ability of children to understand what was 
implied when pictures of street layouts were shown from various viewpoints, such as oblique or 'bird's-eye' 
views. She found such pictures could indeed cause difficulty for young children. Problems have been found 
with a range of other pictorial devices, including the use of dotted lines to convey the path someone might 
take and other conventional symbolism. Too much inessential detail also causes difficulties. Thus, process 
evaluation is obviously important in the development of materials. Even more important, however, is 
outcome evaluation designed to assess whether the children actually behave more safely as a result of what 
they have learned. 
The results of such studies as have addressed this question have unfortunately provided little support for the 
effectiveness of printed materials. For example, a major source of printed materials in the UK has been the 
Tufty Club, which illustrates good road sense through the behaviour of an attractive squirrel character. 
Recently, Tufty has emerged in a new guise thought to be more appropriate for children in the 1990s. These 
materials serve the important function of bringing road safety to the attention of very young children and 
their parents. Whether they lead directly to improved road behaviour is questionable, however. Earlier 
versions of these materials were evaluated by Firth (1973) who did find improvement in road crossing 
knowledge when the books were read to children individually over a two-week period. However, this did not 
generalise to a behavioural test or to tests using a model set-up. In a later study, Antaki, Morris and Flude 
(1986) found that children trained with Tufty materials did not even exhibit superior road safety knowledge 
to peers who had not received such training when tested using video and picture cards. 
In a frequently quoted study, Schioldborg (1974, 1976) conducted an extensive evaluation of the Norwegian 
Traffic Club, which operated by means of twice-yearly mailings of material to parents. The evaluation 
showed, amongst other things, a substantial difference in accident rates between the children of members 
and non-members amounting to 20% in the country as a whole and as much as 40% in the Oslo area. This 
study is often quoted as illustrating the benefits of traffic clubs and has been behind recent attempts to mount 
similar ones in this country (e.g., Downing, 1981). The difference in accident rates was matched by the 
results of tests of traffic knowledge which showed members to be clearly superior to non-members. 
However, when these groups were unobtrusively filmed in the streets near their schools and their behaviour 
later appraised, the results were much less convincing. Members did display slightly better behaviour on 
some of the criteria but on most there was no improvement at all. Moreover, the effect was only found when 
the children were alone: when accompanied by others, the member/non-member difference disappeared. 
This major mismatch between accident rates and the behaviour which the children actually displayed 
suggests that the decrease in accidents cannot be unequivocally attributed to improved road behaviour. 
Indeed, since membership was voluntary, it is quite possible that the parents who enrolled their children had 
more protective attitudes to begin with, thereby creating a bias in the results. Alternatively, it may be that 
parents became increasingly aware during the course of the programme of just how vulnerable their children 
were (something that is quite common when parents get involved in road safety education), causing them to 
adopt more protective attitudes as a result. In either case, the difference between members of the traffic club 
and non-members would reflect differences in exposure to risk rather than differences in the child's 
behaviour as a result of training. 
Finally, a marked aspect of the Scandinavian traffic clubs was the effort they made to persuade parents to 
use practical training: indeed, the study is often quoted as illustrating the benefits of a practical approach. 
Consequently, it is not possible to consider the study as supporting the effectiveness of printed materials per 
se. 
In summary, none of these findings give much reassurance that books, posters or other printed materials are 
very effective in improving children's readiness to face the roads. It seems undoubtedly true that their 
knowledge improves as a result of such material. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that their behaviour 
out on the street changes to match.  
2.23 Film techniques 
Appealing extensions to printed materials are those that make use of film, video or slides because of their 
ability to illustrate material that is difficult to verbalise such as movement or behaviour sequences. It is also 
well known that such media can be successful both in securing and holding children's interest. 
A number of packages involving this type of material have been constructed but, once again, few of these 
have been evaluated (Singh, 1982). Such studies as have been attempted (mainly on an experimental basis) 
reveal rather mixed results. In a well-known early study, Pease and Preston (1967) evaluated a road safety 
propaganda film "Mary Had a Little Lamb", aimed at teaching children how to use the kerb drill. Although 
the film was attractive and had a relatively clear-cut objective, when later tested in a simulated road-crossing 
situation 5 and 6 year olds who had seen the film did not show superior ability to use the kerb drill relative 
to children who had not seen it. Moreover, the study raised a number of questions concerning children's 
ability to generalise from films that have implications for the use of visual media in general. 
Other film approaches have been somewhat more successful. For example, McKelvey (1978) presented 
children with filmed shots of approaching traffic in an effort to teach them how to distinguish safe gaps 
where crossing could be attempted from unsafe ones that should not be accepted. McKelvey found that the 
youngest children (up to grade 3) showed improved ability to discriminate gaps after training, provided they 
received plenty of feedback during the training sessions. However, this improvement was not seen in older 
children. Moreover, whether such improvements would transfer to judgements at the roadside was not 
assessed. 
Similarly, Colborne (1971) used slide presentations to teach crossing behaviour to 7 and 8 year-olds. The 
children were later tested in a traffic garden and some beneficial effects were found. On the other hand, 
Nummenmaa and Syvanen (1970) found that, whilst slide presentations increased traffic knowledge in 5-7 
year-olds, they had no influence on their behaviour in the traffic environment, a finding later replicated for 
films (Nummenmaa and Syvanen, 1974). However, if the film was supplemented by practical training (the 
children received roadside training from their parents), there was a marked improvement in the behaviour 
exhibited in the traffic garden tests. The authors concluded that the practical training on real roads had been 
decisive. However, the role of the films per se was much more ambiguous. 
2.24 Video techniques 
Similar conclusions must apply to video productions if these are used as a simple alternative to films. 
However, video offers a flexibility not available to film in that 'local' productions can be made illustrating, 
for example, dangers in children's own locality. They may even incorporate the children themselves as 
subjects. It is possible that material targeted in this way may be more effective than general productions. 
Certainly, the use of video feedback has taken an important place in athletics and sports training. Few 
studies have systematically explored this approach in road safety, however. 
Cyster (1980) reports that video sequences in which children saw themselves and their friends made a 
considerable impact on primary school children, as shown by their ability to vividly recount details of the 
recording two or three weeks later. However, one can hardly be sure that it was the road safety content of the 
production that made the lasting impact. No effort was made to determine memory for the specifically road 
safety features of the video. More encouragingly, Valavuo (1976) taught children using videos of their own 
road behaviour (they had earlier been unobtrusively filmed) and found some later behavioural improvement. 
This was not the case for controls who had received an equal amount of conventional instruction. This 
suggests that the feedback capabilities of video may well be worth exploring. Certainly, the recent use of 
video feedback by police to demonstrate to drivers their own earlier dangerous behaviour suggests that this 
can have a powerful impact. Of course, in such cases drivers probably find it in their best interests to 
perceive their previous behaviour as shocking. Nevertheless, it is not hard to see potential in this approach 
and further research in this direction certainly seems merited. 
On the whole though, and despite many appealing aspects, it is difficult to disagree with Singh's (1982) 
conclusion that there is really no convincing evidence of substantial benefits following instruction with most 
of the film or video material that has been produced to date. Certainly, there is no evidence of changes in 
everyday road behaviour. However, we have stressed that any technique is only as good as its content and it 
may be that films or videos focusing on some of the skills or behaviours discussed in Chapter 1 might 
produce beneficial results. We have already mentioned examples in which an effort was made to improve 
roadside timing judgements. It would seem to be well worth while exploring whether such materials could 
be made more effective. Similarly, film or video might form useful illustrations of safe and dangerous 
locations and of what would be appropriate behaviour at such locations. Whether this would lead to changes 
in children's behaviour is, of course, an empirical matter requiring validation. However, there seems to be 
enough suggestion of potential in such materials when properly directed to make the effort worthwhile. 
2.25 Behavioural techniques 
Much less widely used than the above techniques are simulations or practical training of some sort that 
involve an element of active, behavioural participation by the child. Simulations might take the form of test 
tracks, traffic gardens or more limited set-ups in the playground, school hall or gym. Alternatively, training 
might take place in the real traffic environment in which case more elaborate problems could be tackled. For 
example, Young and Lee (1987) and van Schagen and Rothengatter (1986) used such an approach to assess 
and train visual timing and gap acceptance skills. A basic question with any simulation is, of course, the 
extent to which it successfully imitates the real world. However, the evidence to date suggests that a 
behavioural approach using life-like set-ups is by far the most promising approach to road safety training, 
and that the more life-like the task, the more likely it is to induce appropriate learning. 
For example, in an early (unpublished) study, Johansson (1967) compared the effectiveness of training in a 
real traffic situation with training in the school yard and traffic garden. The real training situation proved 
superior to the other conditions. Sandels (1975) reported two experiments conducted with 6 and 7 year olds 
in which the benefits of training in streets closed off to traffic was compared to traffic gardens and 
schoolyard training. A further experiment compared the effectiveness of street training in relation to 
classroom instruction. The results showed that training in the real streets was superior to classroom training 
and also superior to training in the schoolyard and traffic garden. 
Similarly, Saska (1971) found real street training superior to training in a traffic garden, whilst those trained 
in the latter also performed better than controls. Colborne (1971) found that traffic garden training was 
superior to classroom instruction for 6 year-olds although the effect was not found with 7 year-olds. An 
important finding in the Saska study was that the benefits of real world training were much more marked in 
younger children. This is consistent with the view already expressed in this report that early training should 
concentrate on behaviour, with verbally-oriented material being reserved for older children. Unfortunately, 
current educational approaches seem to operate mainly in the opposite direction: that is, insofar as practical 
instruction is given at all, it tends to be with older children. From the psychological point of view, this seems 
to be the wrong way round. We discuss this issue in detail in the next chapter. 
Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in practical training methods and several series of studies 
have attempted to teach well-defined behavioural skills of the kind described in Chapter 1. Since these 
studies sought to combine clearly specified content with detailed behavioural methods, we believe these 
deserve particularly careful consideration. 
2.26 Training visual timing skills 
The importance of these skills has already been discussed in Chapter 1. Here, we examine the extent to 
which it might be possible to promote their development in young children. Approaching the problem in this 
way represents a considerable change in current practice. As we have seen, the Green Cross Code simply 
advises children to wait until the road is clear before crossing. Such advice may be functional for the very 
young child who crosses mainly quiet roads where it is feasible to wait for the traffic to clear. However, on 
many roads, if pedestrians waited for the road to clear completely, they would be waiting all day. Moreover, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, children often apply such rules in a very rigid way, sometimes refusing to cross if a 
car is anywhere to be seen at all. Sometimes, this applies to cars that are stationary, moving in the opposite 
direction or so far away that they can barely be seen. This degree of rigidity is not functional and suggests 
that the children are not simply adopting a conservative criterion of safety but are blindly following a rule. 
Obviously, at some stage the child must learn to cross in a more efficient manner, choosing gaps in the 
traffic that are safe to pass through and rejecting those that are not. We might argue about the age at which 
such training should begin, but that the skills must be learned cannot be doubted. 
Eventually, everyone becomes highly proficient in making these judgements, as studies of adult crossing 
behaviour demonstrate (e.g., Routledge et al., 1976; Lee et al., 1984; McLaren, 1993). In fact, adult 
behaviour is very different from what road safety teaches. For example, adults do not stop at the kerb as the 
Green Cross Code advises, because adults tend to assess the situation well before approaching the kerb so 
they have less need of kerb delay. When assessing the traffic situation, adults tend to look ahead at 
upcoming gaps, estimating if they are large enough (in temporal terms) to pass through. Having anticipated 
the arrival of a suitable gap, they tend to step out smartly after the first car has passed, thereby making the 
gap to the next vehicle as large as possible. Such behaviour would appear to be rather skilful and is 
obviously necessary in order to cross busier roads. 
Children, on the other hand, show none of this anticipation. Instead, children look at each car in isolation, 
paying little attention to others until the first one has passed. They also do not seem to concentrate on the 
variables that are really critical in making crossing judgement. For example, they are more likely to focus on 
characteristics such as the car's colour, size, etc., rather than on the spatio-temporal variables that are 
necessary in making strategic judgements. Children certainly do not seem able to identify the most relevant 
variables spontaneously and this would seem to be an important task for road safety education. 
Unfortunately, current educational methods do not appear to be very effective at doing this. Indeed, although 
everyone comes to adopt the adult strategy sooner or later, it seems that children both develop and test these 
skills entirely on their own, experimenting on real roads, and without any guidance whatsoever. Eventually 
they become quite skilled at it. Unfortunately, many do not do so without mishap. 
It is obvious that such skills must be learned. Two questions then arise. Firstly, at what age might children 
be expected to benefit from such training? This question is crucial, because it has been widely assumed that 
the psychological capacities required to make such judgements do not normally appear until around 9 years 
of age (see Chapters 1 and 3). Secondly, what would be an appropriate training method? Since visual timing 
is a basic perceptuo-motor skill, it seems unlikely that it could be acquired by purely verbal means in the 
classroom. Practical experience would seem to be essential, preferably in a naturalistic setting. However, we 
can hardly ask children to start walking out in front of passing vehicles in order to practice such judgements: 
a safe alternative must be found. 
2.261 The pretend road method 
One ingenious way of doing this has been developed by Lee and his colleagues at Edinburgh University 
(Lee et al., 1984; Young and Lee, 1987). Their method is to set up a 'pretend' road parallel to a real one. The 
children view traffic approaching on the real road but they cross on the adjacent pretend one. This means 
that they make genuine visual timing judgements and co-ordinate their movements to that information in the 
normal way. However, because they do not cross the real road, no harm comes to them if they make 
mistakes. Indeed, such mistakes provide feedback and promote learning. Tests with adults show that their 
behaviour when crossing the pretend road is virtually identical to their behaviour when crossing real roads. 
Thus, the pretend road seems like a simple yet effective simulation that could be used both to assess timing 
skills in children and to teach the skills in a realistic but safe environment. 
When children were tested on the pretend road, a number of characteristic features emerged. Firstly, children 
tended to be extremely conservative in their judgements, missing many opportunities where they could have 
crossed in complete safety. Among 5 to 7 year-olds, as many as 45% of safe gaps were rejected in this way. 
Adults, on the other hand, rejected only about 10% of such gaps. 
Secondly, children also made a small number of 'tight fits': that is, they accepted gaps which were too short 
to pass through safely and which would have put them at risk if accepted on real roads. Such tight fits were 
made on a relatively small number of crossings (9%) and adults also sometimes made tight fits. 
Nevertheless, tight fits only need to be made once. The fact that children did this on a number of occasions 
just in the short time during which they were tested (and when they were probably behaving more cautiously 
than usual to please the experimenter) is a cause for concern. 
Children were also inefficient in their use of the time that was available to them for crossing. Adults and 
older children would typically look ahead, anticipating whether approaching gaps would be large enough to 
pass through. Once the leading car had passed, they would them step out promptly behind it, thereby 
maximising the time available before the next car arrived. Indeed, adults would often have a 'negative delay': 
that is, they would step out before the leading car had passed, tucking in behind it. Younger children, on the 
other hand, showed none of this anticipation. Generally, they would not even consider whether it might be 
possible to cross until after the leading car had passed and would then lose more time trying to decide 
whether they should go or not. Many perfectly safe opportunities to cross were routinely missed in this way. 
Finally, young children were much less consistent in their judgements than adults. This inconsistency was 
found in the size of gaps they chose on different occasions; in the time they allowed to elapse before 
stepping out; and in the time they took to cross the road. 
2.262 Training visual timing on the pretend road 
Recently, several studies have investigated the possibility of improving these skills through training (Young 
and Lee, 1987; Demetre et al., 1992, 1993). Training was conducted with 5 year-olds and simply involved 
getting the children to cross the pretend road, and discussing their performance with them after each 
crossing. 
After six half-hour training sessions (at the rate of about two per week), significant improvements were 
apparent. There was a marked reduction in the number of missed opportunities, which appeared to be due to 
an improvement in anticipation of suitable gaps in the traffic. That is, the children were looking ahead to 
assess gaps before the leading car arrived. They also stepped out more briskly after the first car passed, 
showing that decisions were being made earlier and more efficiently. 
It is important to note that the reduction in missed opportunities was not due to the children simply 'going 
earlier', in a blind sort of way. Had this happened, there would not just have been a decrease in missed 
opportunities: there would have been an increase in the number of tight fits. However, this did not happen. 
The children were thus not simply learning to behave in a riskier fashion to reduce the time they spent 
waiting at the kerb. Rather, they were improving their strategies and skills on the road. 
Finally, children's judgements became more consistent, showing that they had improved their criterion as to 
what is an acceptable gap, and even their crossing times became more consistent, again making comparisons 
of the time available relative to the time required to cross easier to calculate.  
These findings, then, show how a practical, behavioural approach may hold promise as a means of teaching 
children as young as 5 years some of the more complex skills that are needed to deal with traffic. Note that it 
is very difficult to see how these skills could possibly be taught through verbal rules or, indeed, through any 
current classroom approaches. Wherever practical perceptual and motor skills are involved, it seems unlikely 
that we will find effective substitutes for behavioural training. 
2.263 Alternatives to the pretend road method 
One drawback of the pretend road method is that it requires access to a fairly wide piece of ground next to a 
real road where the pretend road can be set up. In many areas this would not be feasible, making it difficult 
to capitalise on the method. Recently, Demetre et al. (1993) have adapted the pretend road method in an 
effort to make it more readily usable, by devising variations in which the children make judgements whilst 
standing at the kerbside. These variations have both advantages and disadvantages over the pretend road: on 
the credit side, the children receive a more natural view of the traffic because they stand right at the kerb and 
not a whole road width away. On the other hand, the child does not actually cross, so quite a lot of valuable 
information about the co-ordination of action to perceptual information is lost. 
In fact, children's performance appears to be quite similar in these various cases. Following training, 
reductions in missed opportunities were observed without any increase in tight fits, as in the pretend road 
studies. Similarly, there was an improvement in starting delays. Thus, although the children did not have the 
opportunity to test their judgements by actually crossing, the kerbside versions of the task would seem to 
offer a viable alternative to the full pretend road method where the latter is difficult to set up. Similar 
approaches have recently been developed by researchers elsewhere, again with encouraging results (e.g., van 
Schagen, 1988). Further research on the refinement of such methods certainly seems merited. For example, 
we are currently interested in whether training with video recordings of traffic gaps or experience using 
computer simulations of such tasks might improve children's skills and generalise to roadside judgements. 
Currently, no research has tackled these problems but the interest of the research is obvious.  
In conclusion, these methods offer a way of providing children with meaningful roadside experience that 
seems to improve their pedestrian skills after remarkably little training. Considering that the subjects in most 
of these studies were as young as 5 years of age, the findings are hard to reconcile with the common view 
that maturational factors preclude acceleration of such skills until several years later. It appears that the 
critical factor is the appropriateness of the training method, not the age of the child. 
2.27 Perception of safe versus dangerous locations 
In the previous chapter, we highlighted the problem of how children select places to cross the road when 
they are neither accompanied nor close to controlled crossing facilities. In such cases children must find for 
themselves safe places at which to apply the Green Cross Code. As we saw in Chapter 1, children below the 
age of about 9 show remarkably little insight into the factors that render sites safe or dangerous and they will 
readily cross at dangerous locations if given the opportunity to do so (Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson, 
1991). Once again this limitation is not recognised by current educational methods, yet children's extremely 
limited ability to appreciate the intrinsic dangers posed by a wide variety of roadside locations must 
frequently render them vulnerable on the road. Methods are therefore urgently required to improve such 
judgements. 
Several studies have recently attempted to address this problem. Thomson et al. (1992) and Ampofo-
Boateng et al. (1993) developed a training procedure which could be used either at the roadside or using a 
model set-up in the classroom. In addition, the method was adapted for use either with individual children or 
with groups of up to five children working co-operatively. The training was conducted with 5 year-olds, who 
were trained by means of six 30-minute sessions at a rate of one or two per week. The resulting judgements 
were compared to those of older children as well as to age-matched controls. The training procedure was 
designed to improve the children's conceptual understanding of danger rather than merely to instil a list of 
'dos' and 'don'ts', but we defer discussion of the details of the procedures until Chapter 5. The training was 
entirely conducted either in the real world (in the streets near the children's school), or using a table-top 
model of a traffic environment in the classroom. 
The results of the individual training study showed very substantial improvements in children's judgements, 
with the proportion of safe routes rising from 10% to 75%. Remarkably, this placed the five-year olds at 
about the same level as untrained eleven year-olds (Ampofo-Boateng et al., 1993). Moreover, the children's 
justifications of the chosen routes showed evidence of far greater insight than was apparent before training. 
Thus, the children were not simply learning to go through a series of steps or procedures in a blind way. The 
training proved fairly robust, although there was a definite drop-off in the two months following the end of 
the programme, after which the number of safe routes fell to about 50%. This suggests that some refresher 
courses would be needed to maintain the full gains that the programme had induced. However, no significant 
further deterioration took place over the ensuing 6 months so that, 8 months after training, the judgements of 
trained children were still closer to those of nine year-olds than to those of untrained five year-olds. 
Interestingly, there was no difference between those trained at the roadside or on the model (though, of 
course, the children who were trained on the model had received some real-world experience during the pre-
testing which took place at test sites on real roads). 
In a subsequent study, children were trained in groups of five and substantial improvements were again 
observed (Thomson et al., 1992). Interestingly, the improvements seen immediately after training were less 
than in the individual study (around 40% as opposed to 75% of the routes were considered to be safe). 
However, unlike the individual study, there was no deterioration in the two months after the programme 
ended. It is interesting to speculate as to why the training should have proved more robust in this case. One 
possible answer is that the amount of attention the children received in the individual study was so great that 
an 'unnatural' amount of progress was made: that is, the improvements really went beyond what the children 
were capable of sustaining in the long term - an effect that is quite often seen following intensive 
educational experience. Thus, once the intensive educational support was withdrawn, the children gradually 
floated down to a more sustainable level taking into account their age and experience. Nevertheless, that 
level is far above what could be expected in untrained five-year olds. Considering that these improvements 
were induced after only six short training sessions, we might well ask whether further improvements might 
not be induced simply by lengthening the programme by a few sessions. 
Recently, this research has been extended in significant ways. In a series of ongoing studies involving two 
especially vulnerable communities in Glasgow, Thomson (1993) has reported preliminary results of a 
programme in which parents taught safe place finding to groups of (other people's) children. The results 
show that parent volunteers can produce improvements that are at least as good as those achieved by 'expert' 
trainers. Similarly, Tucker (1993) and Davies, Guy and Murray (1993) have recently adapted this 
programme into a traffic trail for use by teachers in schools. Again, improvements were seen following 
training. Thus, various adaptations of practical training programmes have all produced improved judgements 
in what is a rather difficult conceptual skill, and some years before one would otherwise expect an 
equivalent level of skill to emerge. 
2.28 Training to deal with specific situations 
An approach to the problem of road safety that is both different yet in many ways complementary to the one 
proposed here, has been developed in the Netherlands where a systematic, long-term programme of road 
safety training has been in place for a number of years (van der Molen, 1989). 
Their approach, like the one advocated here, starts with a systematic analysis of the tasks that the pedestrian 
faces in traffic. The strategies that experienced pedestrians adopt in order to accomplish these tasks are then 
examined, with a view to defining what the inexperienced road user needs to learn. A difference between 
their approach and the one advocated here, however, is that instead of attempting to develop the skills 
directly, they adapt the adult strategies to a level considered to be more appropriate to the skills of young 
children. These simplified strategies are then introduced at the age when children first start to confront the 
road situations to which they refer (Vinje, 1981; Rothengatter, 1981a). 
Four main strategies have been identified to date. Firstly, there is a Basic Strategy (not unlike the Green 
Cross Code) which is regarded as suitable for introducing to children as young as 4 years. This is regarded 
as useful for children in dealing with quiet streets such as are found in residential neighbourhoods and is 
sufficiently simple for children to comprehend at an early age. However, unlike the Green Cross Code, it is 
recognised that as children grow older they come in contact with an increasingly complex environment in 
which the Basic Strategy will frequently be inadequate. Accordingly, children around 5 years of age are 
introduced to techniques for crossing at parked cars and, at around 6 years, are taught how to cross at 
intersections. These techniques are elaborations of the basic method, so that previous strategies are not 
undermined by later ones. A fourth strategy which has been developed more recently (van Schagen and 
Rothengatter, 1986), is to teach children how to deal with intersections where there is also a parked vehicle - 
situations which are amongst the most dangerous of all (Howarth et al., 1974; Howarth and Repetto-Wright, 
1978). This strategy is taught to children from around age 7. 
The Dutch approach, then, involves a number of stages. Firstly, those road-crossing situations that seem to 
give rise to accidents (and which, it can be assumed, tax the child's road-crossing skills), are identified. 
These are then considered in relation to the ages at which children are likely to start coming across them. 
This helps determine when training of the different strategies should begin. The strategy is then designed 
taking into account the skills that can be expected in children of that age. The approach is essentially 
hierarchical, with each stage building on experience gained during a previous one. The programme as a 
whole has coherence because it is based on a relatively clear theoretical and empirical foundation. Finally, 
the most fundamental aspect of the Dutch approach is that it is practical, using modelling and reinforcement 
methods based on Bandura's (1977) social learning theory to induce the desired changes in children's 
behaviour. 
Detailed evaluations of the training have been made in a number of studies (e.g., Rothengatter 1981a,b, 
1984). The extent to which children's behaviour generalises to the roadside has also been assessed using 
unobtrusive observation techniques (van der Molen, 1983). The programme was designed for use by parents 
working in co-operation with kindergarten schools and substantial improvements in children's behaviour 
were observed following training, together with some evidence of generalisation to the real traffic 
environment. The findings were regarded as sufficiently impressive for extensive materials to be produced 
and the methods have been widely adopted in Dutch schools. A similar approach to road safety education 
has been taken in Germany (DVR, 1990). 
This approach has many admirable features, as well as several points in common with the overall view 
advocated here. However, in one or two respects it remains susceptible to some of the criticisms we have 
made of other approaches. For example the Basic Strategy, like the Green Cross Code, does not teach 
children how to recognise a dangerous place or find a safe one. To some extent, this problem is tackled in 
later parts of the programme where the dangers of parked vehicles and intersections are implicit. However, 
we have already noted that the ability to find a safe place logically precedes the need for a crossing strategy 
and this does not seem to be fully appreciated in the Dutch system any more than in the British. 
A second issue arising from this work concerns the teaching of children how to cross at parked cars or 
intersections. Many authorities are extremely uneasy about training children to cross at such sites: indeed, 
the advice often offered in the UK is to avoid such situations and cross elsewhere. This would apply 
particularly to the car/junction combination which clearly taxes the abilities of 7 year-olds (van Schagen, 
1985). The Dutch approach, on the other hand, is to teach children specifically how to cross at such locations 
rather than how to avoid them. There is thus a controversial aspect to this approach. 
Our own feeling is that the child must, at some point, learn to cross in the vicinity of parked vehicles 
because, in many cases, there is simply nowhere else to cross. Having a safe and effective strategy for 
dealing with such situations is therefore essential to all pedestrians. However, it is vital that children learn to 
appreciate the intrinsic danger in such situations in advance of being offered a strategy to deal with them. 
Indeed, unless the child appreciates this, there is the very real risk that they might fail to see the point of the 
strategy at all, with the risk that it will be applied blindly or, at best, with only partial comprehension. This 
is, of course, a criticism we have already levelled at the Green Cross Code. Thus, training in the recognition 
of safe and dangerous sites should either precede or accompany training of such strategies. 
Nevertheless, a combination of approaches emphasising, on the one hand, the strategies that children need at 
different ages and, on the other, the skills that will enable them to adopt increasingly efficient strategies in a 
logical and systematic way, seems by far the most sensible way for road safety education to proceed. 
Programmes should be developed so that children of different ages receive meaningful training that is 
appropriate to their abilities and level of experience. 
2.3 Conclusions 
In summary, problems exist with many widely used traditional methods of road safety. Doubts must also be 
expressed with regard to the content of much education, which concentrates on knowledge rather than 
behaviour. Since the aim of road safety education is to enable children to behave safely in traffic, a shift of 
emphasis is needed with regard to fundamental aims and objectives. It can no longer be assumed that 
knowledge translates into behaviour at the roadside. The evidence shows that this simply does not happen. 
The studies reviewed in this chapter clearly point to the benefits of a behavioural approach. The fact is, 
many of the skills that young children need simply cannot be taught by other means. For instance, it is hard 
to see how timing skills could possibly be taught by verbal means. In many ways road crossing is similar to 
any other skill involving perceptuo-motor judgements. Skiing or swimming, driving or learning to ride a 
bike all require practical experience: no one ever learned to do any of these things just sitting at a desk. Yet 
this is precisely how we expect young children to learn to cross the road. Meanwhile, the practical 
experience that does eventually turn children into skilled pedestrians is picked up on real roads and under the 
supervision of no-one. Little wonder that so many fail to reach adulthood without mishap. 
The advantage of practical training is not just that it exercises particular skills such as visual timing, but that 
it educates other skills as well. In the case of the pretend road, for instance, the children do not just learn to 
make timing judgements. By becoming tuned to the 'affordances' of traffic (Gibson, 1979; Lee et al., 1984), 
they learn about many other aspects of the traffic environment as well. They also learn how to deploy the 
basic skills in appropriate strategic form. Roadside training can also be expected to educate the child's 
attention and visual search, making them more attuned to relevant information and less attuned to what is 
irrelevant. Inexperienced children simply cannot be expected to know what to look for on the road, any more 
than the novice skier can be expected to know what terrain features are important in skiing down a 
mountainside (Lee et al, 1984). Giving children the opportunity to behave meaningfully in traffic improves 
this attentional tuning in a natural manner as they gradually focus in on what it is they need to attend to. This 
also helps undermine the rigidity problem discussed earlier. The trouble with simply telling children to 'look 
around' before crossing is that, when these instructions are divorced from the reality to which they refer, they 
end up going through a ritual whose function they scarcely understand. However, children trained in making 
timing judgements are much more likely to look before crossing because they can't make timing judgements 
without doing so. They are no longer going through a series of head movements because someone told them 
to: they are picking up information and are making whatever movements are necessary to accomplish this. It 
is the picking up of information that is crucial, not the executing of abstract movements. The difference 
between the two is fundamental. 
Finally, when a behavioural approach is taken, it is possible for training to be undertaken much earlier than 
with other methods. For example, we have seen that the Green Cross Code is generally regarded as 
unsuitable until the child has reached 7 years of age. This is primarily due to the limited verbal skills of 
younger children and to their extremely limited ability to generalise from verbal rules to behaviour. By 
contrast, when the Code is taught behaviourally, children can be taught to successfully follow the precepts as 
young as 4 years of age (Rothengatter, 1981a). All this points to the conclusion that practical training should 
receive far greater weighting than it does at present. However, this would require a major shift in what are 
currently perceived to be the aims and objectives in road safety education. 
Chapter 3 
Theories of Development 
3.1 Why is practical training effective? 
The review of current practice in road safety education presented in Chapter 2 strongly suggests that 
practical methods of instruction in pedestrian skills are the most likely to be effective. Programmes based on 
roadside training or using realistic simulations have been found to lead to improvements in visual timing and 
gap selection, to increased ability to identify safe and dangerous crossing locations, and to enhanced learning 
of appropriate strategies for crossing at parked cars and junctions. Moreover, such training has produced 
positive results with children as young as five years, making them behave like older, more experienced 
pedestrians. Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, unobtrusive observation has provided evidence of 
generalisation to everyday traffic behaviour. Such behavioural changes have seldom, if ever, been reported 
following traditional road safety education. However, these results in themselves tell us little about which 
aspects of such training are important and thus worth further refinement. For example, the behavioural 
programmes implemented in Holland (e.g. Rothengatter, 1984) were deliberately designed to employ the 
principles of Social Learning Theory, which emphasises the acquisition of new behaviours via the imitation 
of actions modelled by others (see e.g. Bandura and Walters, 1963). This might seem to provide a clue to the 
source of these programmes' effectiveness, except that it is hard to explain the improvements in safe crossing 
location produced by Thomson et al. (1992) in these terms: their method only presented ostensible 
opportunities for modelling and imitation as a last resort. If the intention is to design more global 
programmes of training it would seem desirable, then, to consider what, if anything, the relatively different 
methods of practical instruction might have in common at a more fundamental level; i.e. to attempt to 
establish some more overarching account of why the practical approach works, so that we can capitalise on 
the processes involved. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some aspects of the major theories of child 
development and learning, to see what light they shed. 
3.2 Theories of the process of development 
There are four main bodies of theory which have a bearing on road safety education, and taken together 
these may in fact be argued to represent the primary orientations within contemporary developmental 
psychology, outside of work on language acquisition. The potential contribution of each to our 
understanding of how pedestrian skills are learnt is examined in turn below. 
3.21 J.J. Gibson 
The first corpus to be considered here is that which has grown up around the work of J.J. Gibson, who, 
whilst not a developmental psychologist per se, was a major contributor to understanding of the acquisition 
and development of perceptual-motor skills. It has already been argued in Chapter 1 that such skills 
constitute a considerable part of what the novice pedestrian has to acquire, and indeed, in Gibsonian terms, 
the road crossing task is at root a perceptual-motor problem rather than one of higher-order interpretation 
and cognitive construction. 
There are two main strands to Gibson's theory (Gibson, 1979) which are of particular relevance here. The 
first is the notion that organisms, in order to survive, need rapid access to information about their own 
movements and the movements of others within the environment. As a result of this evolutionary pressure, 
the visual system of human beings (and many other species) has become capable of extracting salient 
temporal information directly from the visual field. We have already seen in Chapter 1 that the optical 
variable t (corresponding to the rate of dilation of an object or surface on the retina) is inversely proportional 
to the time-to-contact of the object with the eye. Thus the information required to judge the time-to-arrival 
of an approaching object is directly specified in the optic array and does not need to be cognitively 
constructed via extrapolation from data about distance and rate of change of position. Thus, the notion that 
such judgements require integration of several variables and therefore cannot be made by children below the 
stage of concrete operations is seriously questioned by this research. 
The second strand is that, for Gibson, perception is ultimately bound to action, and environmental events are 
perceived in terms of the actions which they afford. Therefore, the perception of time-to-contact is a 
perception of the potential for action within that time. In these terms the developmental task, then, is one of 
refinement through experience of the direct perception of specific temporal information and the calibration 
of this with the requirements of different kinds of action.  
One major implication of this is that perceptual judgements and motor responses can only be learned in the 
contexts in which they occur, or close analogues thereof. Although human beings are from infancy well-
attuned to aspects of visual information, they still need to differentiate the specific perceptual regularities to 
attend to in a given situation, and to link these with the behavioural opportunities afforded by that specific 
configuration. In the pedestrian context the principal instance of this would be refinement of the perception 
of temporal information about traffic gaps vis à vis opportunities to cross (cf. Demetre et al., 1992): i.e. 
learning to differentiate time-to-contact intervals which provide a safe opportunity to cross from those which 
do not. Such differentiations can only be made in the first instance in terms of situation-specific information 
about the range of gaps available, the individual's own rate of movement and the width of road to be 
covered. Although with experience grasp of the relationship between these parameters may become more 
generalised (one might draw an analogy with an algebraic equation), it cannot in any functional sense be 
learnt from scratch at this level. In Gibsonian terms, then, perceptual-motor learning is necessarily a process 
of bottom-up development of skills within the context of their application. From this standpoint, practical 
training works because it provides an opportunity for this to happen. 
Admittedly, Gibson's perspective may seem to some extent restricted when viewed against our earlier 
characterisation of the knowledge held by expert pedestrians. In Chapter 1, for instance, road-crossing skills 
of the kind outlined above were not seen as being self-contained, but instead as part of a broader 
conceptualisation of the traffic environment that determines how and when they would be used. However, 
Gibsonian theory is significant because of the emphasis that it places on the idea that learning occurs 
through the acquisition and refinement of specific actions in specific contexts and subsequent generalisation 
from these. This is, in fact, a theme common among many developmental theorists, and the same kind of 
sequence has been used by two major figures in particular, Piaget and Vygotsky, to account for the 
development not just of perceptual-motor skills, but of the conceptual underpinnings which might affect 
their deployment. 
3.22 Jean Piaget 
Any outline of Piagetian theory must necessarily be prefaced by an acknowledgement of the fact that this 
framework was developed over half a century of work and has many complexities that cannot be dealt with 
in the space of a brief report such as this. What follows is an account of some of the basic principles that are 
of relevance for the road crossing task (for more detailed summaries see e.g. Piaget, 1985; Flavell, 1963; 
Vuyk, 1981). 
For Piaget, all knowledge was the result of a process of internal construction directed towards ever better 
(i.e. more accurate and more parsimonious) representations of the world in terms of the activities that could 
be carried out within it and the objects to which those activities applied. The basic building block of this 
process of construction was what Piaget termed a scheme, a cognitive unit which defines the sequence of 
action to be performed towards an object in a particular context (i.e. a form of "action plan").  
In early infancy, schemes are identical with reflexes: i.e. simple structures which instigate specific actions 
when a particular kind of stimulus is present (e.g. raising an arm defensively against a looming object). 
However, activation of a reflex provides the infant with experience of performing the relevant action in 
different contexts, with all their concomitant variations. In other words, the potential of the reflex becomes 
translated into separate experiences. As a result, over time single reflexes become differentiated into a series 
of more specific schemes. 
Subsequent learning occurs through the operation of three interrelated processes, assimilation, 
accommodation and equilibration. Assimilation is the process of matching up on-going experience of the 
world with existing knowledge: i.e. identifying (unconsciously, at least at first) which scheme best fits the 
circumstances in hand. Accommodation is the process of attempting to fit that scheme to current experience, 
altering it in minor ways, if necessary, to provide a better fit (e.g. modifying the angle of the defensively 
raised arm to take into account the trajectory of the approaching object). Assimilation and accommodation 
can be regarded as complementary, since together they provide the means by which existing schemes are 
modified to take into account new information about the action-object relationship with which they deal. At 
root, these processes constitute a simple feedback system: failure to apply an identified scheme successfully 
results in the modification of action towards its object until success is achieved and the scheme is redefined 
(i.e. assimilation and accommodation have been brought into line with each other). 
The successive calibration or "balancing" of assimilation and accommodation which this implies, together 
with its impact on schemes, serves to define the basic operation of the process of equilibration. This can be 
regarded as a pressure towards the maintenance of a correspondence between the world as cognised and the 
world as experienced. However, the mechanisms of equilibration go beyond the kind of adjustment 
described thus far. On occasion it will happen that the scheme to which some aspect of the world has been 
assimilated has so poor a fit to circumstances that it cannot be applied without considerably more than minor 
modification (i.e. accommodation has failed). Under these conditions equilibration acts to restore balance by 
instigating two types of more far-reaching cognitive change. The first is further differentiation of an existing 
scheme into new schemes which highlight the distinctive properties of actions and objects previously treated 
as being identical. The second is coordination of separate schemes into structures which highlight previously 
unperceived regularities of objects or actions across different contexts. The latter process is of particular 
interest for present purposes since it is through coordination that the child constructs on the one hand 
concepts of objects which are independent of specific actions, and on the other, courses of action which are 
independent of specific objects. It should also be noted that the principles of assimilation, accommodation 
and equilibration apply to structures in the same way as they do to schemes, since they are functional 
invariants which operate at all levels of development, despite increases in the complexity of the content 
being dealt with. 
To summarise, then, for Piaget learning basically occurs via the accommodation, differentiation and 
coordination of schemes which detail specific actions towards specific objects; and it constitutes a direct 
response to perceived discrepancies or conflicts between those schemes and experience. Putting this into the 
context of the road-crossing task, one (admittedly rather artificial) example of accommodation might be the 
learning that would occur when a previously familiar stretch of road was encountered under unusual 
circumstances, such as a strong headwind. Although all other parameters of the situation (e.g. traffic flow, 
road width) might remain as expected, and it would therefore be assimilated to the existing scheme, the 
weather conditions would make a significant difference to the rate of the child's movement across the road. 
As a result, the action of beginning to cross would need to be adjusted so that it took place during a longer 
than normal traffic gap. Successful achievement of this objective would lead to modification of the scheme 
to include information about the variation in behaviour that should accompany those conditions (i.e. 
effectively weather would now be included as a specific parameter of the scheme which would, as a result, 
become more generalised in its applicability). 
Similarly, it is possible to identify plausible (if again somewhat simplistic) examples of the occurrence of 
learning through differentiation and coordination in the context of road-crossing. One instance might be 
where a child used to dealing with roads of a certain width became exposed to conditions where this varied 
more dramatically (say by moving from a rural to an urban environment). Corresponding, but unanticipated 
variations in the time taken to cross different roads might result first of all in the differentiation of a single, 
previously adequate, scheme into a limited series of new schemes, each implicitly relating crossing time 
(and hence traffic gap selection) to a specific road width. Continued conflicts between expectation and 
experience might then be resolved by coordination of these schemes into a unified structure which 
highlighted the underlying regularity of relationship between road width and crossing time. This structure 
would provide a more general basis for the selection of the minimum appropriate size of traffic gap 
necessary for safe crossing (cf. the earlier analogy with an algebraic equation).  
Taking the idea a step further, related, albeit more complex kinds of coordinations might also be made under 
circumstances where a child encounters non-uniform vehicle motion (i.e. there is variation in speed, 
deceleration or acceleration) or non-uniform vehicle direction (e.g. where a car is turning a corner at a 
junction). If these conditions occur relatively frequently they may promote the development of structures 
which permit anticipation of the overall pattern of the vehicle's movement, via the coordination of schemes 
or simpler structures which detail its various component parts.  
These examples are intended more as illustrations of the ways in which the processes of learning detailed by 
Piaget might apply to pedestrian activity than as substantive predictions about what learning does actually 
take place. However, they do help to draw out two particular issues of importance. The first is that although 
all aspects of knowledge display a tendency towards generalisation, there is a qualitative difference between 
the effects of accommodation within a scheme and coordination between schemes. The range of 
applicability of individual schemes is broadened by accommodation, but these are still essentially tied to 
specific contexts and the process itself may require little conscious effort. In contrast, coordination produces 
more general constructs (i.e. those which provide information relevant across contexts), and this requires 
explicit connections to be made between different schemes. A central element of Piaget's characterisation of 
this process is the notion of decentration. In order to make a connection between schemes it is necessary for 
the child to attend to an experience not just in terms of the scheme to which it has been assimilated (i.e. in 
terms of one single perspective), but to be aware of at least some of the range of other relevant schemes 
which might be applied to it, and to note the correspondences between these. Piaget suggests that such 
connections are in fact most likely to be made for the first time as a result of reflection after the event, in an 
attempt to resolve perceived conflicts, although they may then be recalled and utilised during an on-going 
experience. 
Whenever it occurs, though, the point is that coordination is intimately bound up with a decentring of 
attention. As will be seen subsequently, this is an idea with profound educational implications. For the 
moment it is sufficient to note the potential role of decentration in, for example, systematising visual search 
(cf. Chapter 1). Attention to a range of related experiences should in itself point up the features which are 
both stable across specific contexts and most consistently relevant to action (i.e. what to look for and where 
to look for it); conversely it should also shift the child's focus away from features which are distinctive but 
transient. Effectively, then, decentration could serve as the primary means by which the child's perceptions 
of what is salient are changed. 
The second issue concerns the role of action within learning. Piagetian theory suggests that learning results 
in a gradual shift of cognition away from a dominant focus on context-bound action, towards broader, more 
context-independent understanding i.e. towards more general conceptualisation. It is important to note, 
however, that this does not imply any downgrading of the status of action within the learning process. Since 
schemes constitute the building blocks of learning, a basic framework of these must be in place before more 
generalised understanding can be constructed in any new area of experience. This in itself provides a 
powerful explanation of why practical, "walk-through" approaches to road safety education tend to be 
successful, irrespective of the precise form that these take. More fundamentally, though, as Smith (1993) 
points out, Piagetian theory accords action a primacy at all levels of development: knowledge is always 
directed at action, whether this is in the form of overt behaviour or corresponding mental operations, and 
construction always occurs as a result of action in this same broad sense. In other words, then, learning is 
always dependent upon active engagement with some task. 
The Piagetian emphasis on learning as a bottom-up process of construction from specific actions in specific 
contexts has obvious correspondences with the account of skill acquisition provided by Gibsonian theory. 
There are also parallels between the two schools of thought in terms of at least some of the kinds of 
mechanisms envisaged as operating within this process (e.g. the differentiation of perceptual invariants and 
the behaviour they afford on the one hand, and the differentiation of schemes on the other). It is possible, 
additionally, to perceive similarities at the level of some basic theoretical tenets. For Piaget as well as 
Gibson, for instance, there is a fundamental relationship between perception and action, which is captured 
by the complementarity of assimilation and accommodation: both theories could be argued to rest on the 
notion of some form of afferent-efferent (i.e. input-output) loop. 
Where Piagetian theory departs is over the idea of the coordination of related instances of these "loops". This 
dimension is of particular importance for present purposes, though, since it means that the theory is capable 
of providing a framework for understanding the development of both skill (i.e. the differentiation of specific 
actions in specific contexts) and its strategic deployment (i.e. the moderation of action according to the 
constraints suggested by more global conceptualisations). Within this framework, skills, strategies, and even 
abstract concepts are not to be seen as separate types of knowledge acquired in distinct ways, but instead as 
parts of a structural hierarchy that emerges over time as the scope of coordination successively increases. 
3.23 L.S. Vygotsky 
The idea of learning as a bottom-up process which begins with contextualised action was identified as 
common to both Gibson and Piaget, but also provides a link through to the work of L.S. Vygotsky, 
acknowledged alongside Piaget as the other great theorist of developmental psychology. Superficially, 
Piaget and Vygotsky appear to have diametrically opposed viewpoints, and they have often been presented 
in this light. In fact, though, closer inspection reveals that the correspondences outweigh the differences in 
many respects. The main point of departure between the two is that whilst Piaget regarded learning as a 
process of internal construction, for Vygotsky learning takes place via the internalisation of socially 
constructed or guided behaviour. Thus in a famous statement of principle, he writes:  
"Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the 
individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child 
(intrapsychological)...All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals." 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57, italics in original). 
Two key points follow from this basic position. Firstly, all organised thought is the mental equivalent of 
action and has its origins within action. To take a simple example, the activity of counting out within one's 
mind the number of e.g. books on a shelf is an internalised application of the developmentally earlier activity 
of physically moving a set of objects into a row whilst counting out "one", "two", "three", "four" and so on. 
Secondly, all organised action is constructed in the first instance in conjunction with those who have already 
mastered its characteristics. To extend the example of counting, the child's first attempts at physically 
seriating and numbering objects would not take place in social isolation, but would instead form part of a 
joint activity directed by a more advanced other (e.g. an adult caretaker) who was already adept at counting. 
This points to another central idea within Vygotskian theory, that of the zone of proximal development. This 
zone, which constitutes a psychological rather than a physical space, is defined in terms of the difference 
between what an individual child can achieve unaided (i.e. what activity they are capable of carrying 
through on their own), and what they can achieve whilst working in conjunction with a more knowledgeable 
other. This idea carries with it a number of important and related implications. 
Firstly, the zone of proximal development is the space within which learning takes place. As Vygotsky puts 
it: "What the child can do in cooperation today he can do alone tomorrow" (Vygotsky, 1962, p.104). 
Secondly, given an initial level of capability on the part of the child, there is an upper boundary to what 
more they can achieve in cooperation with the more advanced other. Not only will no learning occur if the 
joint activity is pitched at a level at or below what the child is already capable of unaided, but it will also not 
occur if it is pitched too far above that level. The greatest learning will occur when the joint activity is at a 
level towards the upper boundary of the zone of proximal development. Thirdly, despite Vygotsky's 
emphasis on the socially directed nature of learning, in common with Piaget he characterises it as a bottom-
up, constructive process. More complex activities or functions build upon simpler, and the range 
encompassed by the zone of proximal development moves forward as learning progresses. 
The key to developmental progression within Vygotskian theory is mastery. Whilst the child may be capable 
of more advanced activity when working under the direction of another person, learning will not occur until 
they begin to take upon themselves the responsibility for directing their own behaviour along the lines 
indicated. Initially, this might mean nothing more than adopting as a kind of habit the external form of 
behaviours constructed during interaction. Over time, however, many of these behaviours (Vygotsky stresses 
that it does not happen in all cases) will become internalised as covert mental operations: the process of 
thought which was formerly used solely to direct external activity becomes separated from action and turned 
inwards to form part of a more integrated system of psychological functioning. As this happens new insights 
become possible and generalised understanding begins to emerge. This is the basis of true mastery. 
In order to understand how internalisation and learning at this higher level occurs, it is necessary to consider 
the remaining central element in Vygotskian theory, the role played by language. During the course of 
interaction between a more and a less able individual (i.e. within the zone of proximal development) the 
activity of both participants is embedded in a sequence of dialogue. Whilst on occasion the more able 
partner may demonstrate the form of some key element of behaviour, more usually they will use language to 
guide and structure the behaviour of the less able, by, for instance issuing corrective feedback, or using the 
deictic functions of language (i.e. its capacity for directing attention) to draw the less able's attention to key 
features of the situation that he/she needs to take into account. (We might note in passing that this use of 
language could equally well serve as a mechanism for promoting Piagetian decentration; this is a point we 
will return to in Chapter 4). 
The direction of the less able partner's activity via language opens up a range of new possibilities. Firstly, 
this language provides a mnemonic for the sequence of actions to be carried out: in the absence of the more 
able partner, the less able can recover that sequence by repeating for him/herself the directions which had 
previously formed part of the interaction. In other words, therefore, it is language that acts as the mechanism 
for transfer of the control of behaviour. Secondly, because of the deictic function of language, what is 
transferred is not a mechanical series of associative prompts but instead the encapsulation of a conscious 
sequence of thought. Thus the transfer of control creates ordered awareness and hence true psychological 
functioning. 
Finally, the language used by the more able partner is an external expression of the thought processes he/she 
is using to guide activity, and stands in the same relation to other aspects of his/her psychological 
functioning as the thoughts themselves. What is transferred therefore is not just conscious control, but part 
of a wider system of understanding which carries with it implicit traces of other relationships. Transfer of 
control, then, is a partial induction into an overarching conceptual framework. By dint of this, the 
internalisation of language (what Vygotsky calls the development of "inner speech") is not simply the basis 
for individual psychological functions, but ultimately for their integration into a coherent system convergent 
with that already developed in other members of the same community. 
Focusing for the moment on the initial, interactive phase of the learning process described by Vygotskian 
theory, the potential applicability of this to an account of at least one way in which children might acquire 
some of the basic skills required by pedestrians is clear-cut. Indeed, there are sufficiently strong parallels 
between the instructional sequence envisaged by Vygotsky and the training method employed by Thomson 
et al. (1992) to suggest that this might explain the latter team's success. Taking this further, we might also 
note that it is possible to see the efficacy of the social learning theory framework employed in the Dutch 
training programmes (e.g. Rothengatter, 1984) in Vygotskian terms. Whilst the explicit emphasis of these 
programmes is on adult modelling of correct behaviour and social reinforcement of subsequent performance 
by the child, it is almost inconceivable that these activities are not embedded in directive dialogue of exactly 
the kind portrayed as central to learning by Vygotsky.  
However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, as in Piagetian theory, for Vygotsky the acquisition 
of concrete sequences of behaviour carries with it the basis for subsequent conceptual development. Again, 
in common with Piaget, this is not seen as being an immediate achievement. In fact considerable emphasis is 
laid (Vygotsky, 1978) on the existence of an intermediate stage in the transfer of behavioural control via 
language. Piaget (1955b) had earlier remarked on the tendency of younger children to talk out loud as they 
proceeded through an activity, terming this phenomenon "egocentric" speech since he held that it was a 
result of the child's lack of awareness that dialogue required at least two participants. Vygotsky interpreted 
the existence of egocentric speech quite differently, seeing it as a halfway point in the internalisation of a 
function, where control of behaviour had passed to the child but thought was still tied to external expression.  
There are other points of greater correspondence between Piaget and Vygotsky as regards conceptual 
development. For example, whilst Vygotsky is to a large extent silent on the precise causes of the 
subsequent advent of full internalisation of functions, he does link it quite explicitly to a change in the 
temporal relationship between thought and action: i.e. thought shifts from accompanying action as a direct 
correlate, to preceding action as a form of planning activity. This formulation contains distinct echoes of 
Piaget on the acquisition of what he terms the symbolic function: i.e., the emergence of schemes as more 
conscious representations of the relationship between actions and objects (as opposed to automatically 
instigated action plans). This allows actions to be represented or thought about rather than performed: as a 
result, thought (in the sense of manipulating representations or symbols), becomes separated from overt 
action. Piaget sees this as the beginning of true representation and the genesis of mental operations. Finally, 
there are also parallels with Piaget in Vygotsky's account of concept formation, in which he describes a shift 
in children's understanding from a focus on external, concrete referents for words to abstract, categorical 
relationships between words (Vygotsky, 1962; see also Luria, 1971). The potential significance of these 
parallels between Vygotskian and Piagetian theory is a point we will return to shortly. 
3.24 Information processing approaches 
Despite varying degrees of difference in their characterisation of the mechanisms involved, there is, then, 
considerable convergence between Gibson, Piaget and Vygotsky in terms of the emphasis they place on 
learning as a bottom-up process which takes as its point of departure the acquisition of context-specific 
actions. The convergence between Piaget and Vygotsky is even closer with regard to what they see as being 
the key features in the growth of more general conceptions. This emerging unanimity about the nature of 
learning does not stop here, however, since there is, in addition, a fourth, looser body of theory derived from 
contemporary information processing approaches to development, which provides a further echo. 
In contrast to the perspectives considered so far, there is no single overarching information processing 
theory of development. Instead, a series of related strands of research can be identified, which share a 
common focus on the development of basic capacities such as the representation and retrieval of 
information, the organisation of the knowledge base, and strategies for problem-solving. In other words, 
these different strands are all concerned at root with what mental processes are used to deal with 
information, how these are organised, and how they change during development. In addition, the main 
constructs employed by different information processing approaches are usually strongly related to those 
used in adult cognitive psychology and cognitive science; there is a similar reliance on the computational 
metaphor, where people are seen as limited capacity manipulators of symbols (Siegler, 1983).  
For present purposes it would be somewhat redundant to pursue any detailed outline of these various strands, 
but one in particular is of central relevance viz. work on the development of scripts (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). Scripts are representations encoding knowledge of recurring events in schematic form. Any single 
instance takes the form of a set of expectations about the relationship between different activities (i.e., how 
they are organised with respect to each other over time), which has been derived from the individual's 
previous experience. In other words, scripts define a likely sequence of actions-on-objects within a unitary 
event.  
A much-cited example of a script, originally given by Schank and Abelson, is that of "going to a restaurant". 
We enter a restaurant with an expectation that a waiter will come and show us to a table, and provide us with 
a menu; that we will then choose what we want to eat, and the waiter will take our order; that shortly 
thereafter our food will arrive, and we will begin to eat it; and so on. One particular point which this 
illustrates is that the content of a script is more general than that of the memory of a specific episode, and 
conversely that any given instance of the type of event that it deals with will inevitably contain minor 
variations or deviations from this schematic outline. At the same time, though, the detail contained in a 
script is sufficiently concrete for it to refer to a definable class of event. In fact, its functional value would be 
much restricted if this were not the case: as it stands a script allows both inference about the course of the 
event ("what is likely to happen next is that...") and guidance of one's own activity within that context. It 
also provides a focal point for the organisation and storage of information from subsequent experiences. 
The available evidence all tends to suggest that scripts are natural and powerful mechanisms for organising 
experience. For instance, Nelson, Fivush, Hudson and Lucariello (1983) asked children to describe different 
types of events such as "what happens when you go shopping". They found that children as young as 3 years 
were able to provide coherent, sequentially organised reports which were general in form (signalled in 
English by use of the present tense: e.g. "you drive to the supermarket, you get a basket" etc.). Nelson and 
Gruendel (1986) asked children about less frequent events (e.g. "What happens when you go to 
Disneyland?"), and found that reports were given in script form after a single experience, implying the 
existence of strong underlying assumptions about the consistency of future occurrences. Fivush (1984) 
followed 5 year olds starting school over a ten-week period, and found a rapid increase in the complexity of 
scripts, including the introduction of conditional elements within the overall sequential structure (e.g. "if it's 
raining we stay in"). 
What is perhaps most striking about this body of research, however, are the manifold parallels between 
scripts on the one hand and particular aspects of schemes or structures in Piagetian theory on the other. 
These parallels extend both to focal content (i.e. a sequence of context-specific actions), and to the processes 
by which further learning occurs. The inclusion of conditional elements, for instance, has echoes of 
accommodation, and holds out the possibility of a form of differentiation or splitting up of scripts as 
experience dictates (e.g. going to a friend's house might initially be seen in terms of a conditional branch 
within the script for going to visit relatives, but a separate script would be likely to develop as key 
differences between the two types of event emerge).  
There is, moreover, a further parallel in the idea that concepts are derived from scripts via the abstraction of 
relations across events (Nelson, 1983; Lucariello and Rifkin, 1986): e.g. the occurrence of the same object in 
different scripts is held to yield a more general object concept, and, similarly, the occurrence of the same 
action performed by different individuals towards different objects is held to yield a more general concept of 
action. Clearly this has a strong resemblance to the coordination of schemes in Piagetian theory to yield 
object and action concepts. In one sense, then, this suggests that script theory could be seen as a restatement 
of Piagetian theory in contemporary terms. The main point, though, is that this convergence of different 
theoretical frameworks on the same structures and processes provides powerful cross-validation for both. 
3.25 Implications 
There are two principal implications that can be drawn from the accounts of learning detailed above, one 
general and one more specific. The general point relates to what we might call the minimum conditions for 
learning. Developmental theory, almost with one voice, argues for the natural progression of understanding 
from action to concept. Given that the knowledge held by the sophisticated pedestrian consists of both 
elements (i.e. a set of perceptual-motor skills, together with broader-based concepts of the traffic 
environment which guide the deployment of these skills), the implication is that methods of instruction will 
be effective when they work consistently with this progression from action to concept rather than when they 
work against it or when they only address limited elements of the process. In these terms, practical training 
methods are successful because they start at the right point in the developmental sequence. 
The more specific point relates to the complementary nature of the accounts provided by Piagetian and 
Vygotskian theory. It is worth noting that Piaget provides rather less detail on the process of acquisition of 
the vast range of actions available even to relatively young children, but Vygotsky provides a well-defined 
mechanism for this. Conversely, Vygotsky is weaker on the process of generalisation from action to concept, 
but this is precisely the strength of Piagetian theory. Given the other correspondences between the two 
which were noted earlier, this suggests they might be seen as providing conjointly a single well-defined 
account of the learning process. 
If so, it implies that any serious attempt to promote the development of appropriate pedestrian behaviour 
ought to begin by explicitly training children in particular actions, within (at least) close analogues of the 
situations in which those behaviours will have to be used; this would provide the necessary basic 
information about the relationship between action and environment in a form which children will adopt and 
use for themselves. Once these patterns of action begin to be established, they can be used as basic 
experiences from which to build a more articulated understanding of the behaviours to be used in different 
contexts, as well as more general concepts about the traffic environment. The precise form that Vygotskian 
and Piagetian theory suggest these two elements of intervention ought to take, together with empirical 
evidence for their effectiveness, is considered in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.3 The issue of rate of development 
Identifying an appropriate sequence that ought to be followed by instruction in pedestrian skills is not, 
however, sufficient. There is also a need to establish the appropriate timing for the application of such 
instruction, whilst bearing in mind the practical reasons for holding to the broad principle of the earlier the 
better (cf. Introduction). The underlying question here is whether there are general constraints on the rate of 
individual development which indicate that training before a certain age would be likely to be a wasted 
effort. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there has in fact been a tendency in the past to assume that there are indeed such 
constraints on what can be achieved with what age of child. From a current standpoint, however, these 
assumptions (at least as usually expressed) are inappropriate and, moreover, ill-founded. Rate of 
development appears to be less constrained than has often been thought, and empirical work suggests that it 
can be accelerated if approached correctly. 
The main reason for these earlier assumptions about rate of development is that as far as educational practice 
is concerned (and this applies to road safety education in particular), calls upon developmental theory have 
primarily been restricted to Piagetian stage theory (see e.g. Piaget, 1955a). According to received wisdom, 
this holds that there are four distinct stages of development which occur at roughly defined ages: the sensori-
motor stage (0-2 years), the pre-operational stage (2-7 years), the concrete operational stage (7-11 years), 
and the formal operational stage (11 years on). These stages are typically regarded as some kind of 
biological constraint, and since the shift into each new stage signals the emergence of new capabilities, it is 
held that tasks which require some particular instance of these cannot be successfully completed until the 
relevant stage has been reached. From this has come the idea that children can only be taught certain things 
"when they are ready". Sandels (1975), for instance, argues that children below the age of 7 or 8 (i.e. pre-
operational children in stage theory terms) are unsafe pedestrians because they lack the necessary cognitive 
abilities to be able to perform the tasks involved (e.g. they tend to fixate on single elements of the traffic 
environment rather than being aware of the complex interaction of different factors). 
One response to this might be to point out that there is good reason to suppose that some of the cognitive 
requirements of being a pedestrian are less than previously thought (see Chapter 1), and that the basic 
perceptual-motor skills involved ought theoretically to be well within the scope of the pre-operational child. 
However, this whole notion is in any case based on a misconception, resulting from the removal of the 
concept of stages from the broader context of Piagetian theory. For Piaget, development proceeded in a fixed 
order (i.e. certain things built on others), but not to a fixed timescale, nor necessarily at a fixed rate across all 
different areas of functioning. As Smith (1993) points out: "The process of construction is time-related, 
because new constructions occur as time passes. But it does not follow from this definition that any such 
construction occurs at a specifiable point in time. Thus it does not follow that it is age related" (p. 39). 
In fact, Piaget explicitly addresses the occurrence of cross-task variability in the child's level of functioning, 
referring to instances of this as décalages. In the context of conservation for example (i.e. grasp of the fact 
that certain properties of objects remain invariant in the face of superficial transformations), Piaget reported, 
and subsequent studies have tended to confirm, that conservation of mass (how much of a substance there is) 
appears before conservation of weight. One possible reason for this is that there are differences in the 
complexity of the structures to be acquired: it could be that conservation of weight appears later simply 
because it requires the additional inference that a given amount of substance has a fixed weight, and hence 
that if substance remains constant then so must weight (note the implication here that conservation of weight 
depends on prior conservation of mass). However, implicit within Piagetian theory is the possibility that the 
frequency of a particular type of experience could also be influential: earlier and more frequent experience 
of the conflict produced by a failure to conserve a given property ought, in principle, to produce earlier 
coordination of the kind required for understanding the notion of conservation in a particular context. 
Consistent with this, Price-Williams, Gordon and Ramirez (1969) found that the children of Mexican 
potters, used to working with clay from an early age, showed precocious ability to conserve mass, although 
they were no better than other children at conserving, for example, weight. 
The wider issue is the question of what precisely it is that brings about a particular decentration (e.g. in 
conservation, noticing that if you roll a ball of plasticene into a sausage shape, as length increases so width 
decreases, in a manner consistent with overall constancy of the amount of plasticene), and whether there is 
any kind of structural limitation on its occurrence. However, given the prerequisite experiences, Piagetian 
theory does not really suggest any inherent constraint on decentration (beyond a certain interdependency of 
ideas) after the symbolic function has been acquired and thought has become to some extent separated from 
action (this being a basic requirement for the ability to shift attention). It just seems to take some time, which 
again holds out the possibility that it is weight of experience (and the conflicts this throws up) that matters. 
This in turn suggests that desired decentrations could be promoted by appropriate interventions. 
One implication of this is that the sensori-motor, pre-operational, concrete operational and formal 
operational stages are best seen as a convenient shorthand for the kind of development that might typically 
be going on in an average child of a given age, as like as not without specific educational intervention. This 
last point is of particular relevance when it comes to any assessment of the validity of the age range usually 
associated with the different stages: given the period and context of the bulk of Piaget's research, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that his subjects may well have been exposed to educational techniques which 
were, relatively speaking, lacking in sophistication. There is in fact good evidence for an impact on 
development of shifts in educational and cultural practice. Research by Flynn (1987), Lynn, Hampson and 
Mullineux (1987), and Fuggle, Tokar, Grant and Smith (1992) all points to the existence of systematic cross-
generational increases in IQ scores on standardised measures which are hard to account for in any other way. 
A further point to note is that even Piaget himself often used the terms for the different stages as broad 
descriptions with rather hazy boundaries. Karmiloff-Smith (1978) takes this as an indication that the number 
of stages was actually dictated by heuristic rather than substantive considerations. This certainly fits in with 
Piaget's tendency, when dealing with different well-defined domains of knowledge, such as velocity and 
flotation, to specify somewhat different patterns of stages and sub-stages. 
Finally, given the bottom-up nature of the process of construction described in section 3.2, to the extent that 
stages exist, it is more appropriate to regard them as emergent characteristics, rather than overarching 
constraints. It is in fact implicit in the notion of décalages that a child can perform at, say, the concrete 
operational level in one context and at the pre-operational in another. With one possible caveat, which will 
be dealt with in the next section, the whole question of stages is really an issue of less theoretical moment 
than it has often been accorded. Certainly, as far as contemporary developmental psychology is concerned, 
the value of Piaget's theory lies in its account of the process of development, not in any indication of the 
absolute timing of specific developmental changes. 
It is possible to discern similar implications about the variability of the rate and timing of learning in more 
recent work such as that of Case (1984, 1985), who adopts an information processing or "neo-Piagetian" 
approach to development. Without going into detail, Case proposes a maturational constraint on the rate of 
development which stems from the size of what he terms the Short Term Storage Space (STSS) available for 
information processing. The underlying idea here is that there are limited attentional resources which have to 
be divided between carrying out operations and storing or retrieving the results of those operations (cf. the 
problems of complexity, capacity, and divided attention mentioned in Chapter 1). Case argues that the 
effective size of the STSS gradually increases, since as operations become more practiced, they require less 
resources, leaving more available for their products within the STSS. 
Whilst Case's account seems, if taken at face value, to suggest that there are global constraints on 
development, the point is that it actually implies a direct effect of training (in the sense of structured and 
targetted experience), albeit one which is restricted to a specific context or domain. As the child practices 
and becomes more adept at carrying out operations in a given domain, they will have greater capacity to 
make more complex coordinations i.e. both to notice more about what is going on and to integrate that 
information as it becomes available, and also to gain greater conceptual insight by making stable 
connections between different aspects of the experience (e.g. noticing the sequence of traffic light changes at 
a complex junction, and gradually building up to using this information in terms of the opportunities it 
presents for action).  
Other research provides a hint of the potential power of specific training of the kind implied. White and 
Horwitz (1988), for instance, report on an intervention in physics which involved children working with a 
computer-based simulation of the motion of objects in order to improve their ability to predict the effects of 
applying different forces. The structured programme surrounding this activity succeeded in raising the 
understanding of 10 year olds above the level of high school students.  
This should not be considered an exceptional result, since there is good evidence for the occurrence of 
apparently precocious development in a variety of areas. For instance, Markovits (1993) reports that children 
as young as 7 or 8 can correctly manipulate the logical properties of conditional relationships ("if P then Q"), 
although this does seem to be dependent on the familiarity and concreteness of the task content (see also 
Markovits and Vachon, 1990). Similarly, Somerville and Wellman (1987) report that before the age of 6 
children are capable of holding in mind and manipulating the set of different possible outcomes of some 
event, although they are less good at judging the relative probabilities of these, and again there is a tendency 
towards variation in performance from one context to another. This last is not necessarily the limitation it 
seems, however, since the evidence for cross-task variability points back again to the possibility that the 
source of such differences is frequency of experience, with all that this implies for the potential effectiveness 
of intervention and training. 
At very least, then, children's capabilities are considerably more elastic than the common interpretation of 
stage theory implies. Well-designed and well-founded educational interventions may achieve progress 
unthinkable within the confines of this narrow perspective. Moreover, whilst the age at which didactic 
interventions would be effective might well be constrained by the child's limited experience (and hence 
ability to relate language to relevant events when used out of context), if action-based training and 
contextualised verbal instruction were used, there seems to be no good reason why this could not begin at 
young age (i.e. at the start of primary school or even earlier). 
3.4 The issue of domain specificity 
Whilst age might not be the constraint that it has previously been thought to be, both Piaget's notion of 
décalages and Case's STSS theory suggest that a different kind of constraint on learning may operate: i.e. 
that it tends to be relatively domain-specific rather than completely generalised. In other words, whilst the 
scope of ideas within a particular domain may increase, cross-domain generalisation may well be more 
restricted. If so, this has obvious implications for the kind of training that might be effective i.e. that it will 
need to be fairly precisely targeted. But how specific does it have to be? How much generalisation can be 
expected? There are two issues here. 
The first of these concerns the flexibility of transfer to varying tasks within the same basic domain. There is 
evidence of both individual and age differences in the extent to which this occurs. Brown and Campione 
(1986), for instance, found that older children were more likely to carry over strategies to successive parallel 
tasks, such as identifying the rule governing a series of letters and a matrix completion exercise, but noted 
that this also tended to vary as a function of IQ. The exact source of these differences is unclear, and this is 
an area where further research is definitely warranted. However, the presence of an age effect again suggests 
that experience and metacognition (cf. decentration) may be important parameters. 
The second issue is the likely extent of cross-domain or "far" transfer. From a theoretical perspective, one 
construct of some relevance here is what Piaget termed structures d'ensemble. These are hypothetical global 
coordinations that crystallise the achievements of a particular stage and spread their effects to all areas of 
functioning. If structures d'ensemble do exist, this suggests that at key points of development learning does 
have a universal effect. However, for a variety of reasons, this notion is not unproblematic.  
One difficulty is that at root the possibility of such global coordinations would seem to depend on the extent 
of the operation of equilibration. For structures d'ensemble to actually occur, there seems to be an implied 
need for the child to perceive at some level the conflicts between all existing structures and to recognise the 
connections between different domains. The trouble is that it is difficult to identify mechanisms which could 
work on such a broad scale (let alone experiences which would trigger their operation). Metacognition and 
decentration are obviously possible candidates, and yet for Piaget the ability to treat one's own thoughts or 
perceptions as objects to such an extent as to be able to make decentrations of the required breadth would be 
a relatively late development. This begs the question of how structures d'ensemble at, say, the pre-
operational level come about, unless they are argued to be simply a cumulative product of more limited 
coordinations. In this respect Piagetian theory could actually be argued to be consistent with at least some 
tendency towards domain specificity. Similarly, whilst social cueing of the connections between different 
domains might conceivably have some effect, this would need to be salient (i.e. to be assimilable to child's 
existing structures), and perhaps also of immediate use to the child. It is hard to see how this could operate 
except on a piecemeal basis.  
There is, in any event, a possibility that the implications of structures d'ensemble have been misunderstood. 
Smith (1993) points out a little-mentioned restriction that Piaget placed upon the applicability of his theory, 
namely that he was talking about development in the "epistemic subject" rather than the individual person. 
In other words, he was claiming that his theory was restricted in its application to that aspect of the 
individual which acts as a rational agent. From this perspective, Smith argues, it makes more sense to see 
structures d'ensemble simply as yardsticks against which to measure performance on structurally similar 
tasks (the ideal subject would perform consistently), and not as implying global coordinations within actual 
individuals. A related notion here is that put forward by Carey (1987), who argues that there are far-reaching 
reorganisations of knowledge that unify otherwise piecemeal developments, but that these are content-
specific and so restricted to operating with certain boundaries: i.e. they relate to overarching "theories" 
applicable to specific domains such as biology or matter. 
In fact, the available evidence tends to favour the position that cross-domain transfer is limited. For example, 
correlations between performance on different Piagetian tasks are frequently little better than moderate. 
Kuhn and Brannock (1977), for instance, compared children's solutions to two problems, one relating to the 
factors affecting healthy plant growth and the other to the factors affecting the motion of a pendulum. 
Association between level of performance on the two was no better than chance. Carraher, Carraher and 
Schliemann (1985) report large-scale differences between the performance of child street vendors in Brazil 
on money calculations on the one hand and comparable classroom mathematics problems on the other. 
Similarly, in one of our own studies in science education (Howe, Tolmie, Anderson and MacKenzie, 1992), 
we noted that although undergraduate students knew from the context of driving a car how to work out 
average speed from information about time and distance, they not infrequently failed to see how to use 
exactly the same type of information in the context of physics problems.  
More generally, Light (1993) points out that contextual constraint is inherent to the idea of script knowledge. 
This, he suggests, accounts for the variation in children's performance on conservation tasks depending on 
how these are framed (see e.g. Donaldson, 1978). From this standpoint, one of the major goals of 
development is the recontextualisation of knowledge (Walkerdine, 1988). However, Adey and Shayer 
(1990), in an examination of the effects of specific training in metacognitive skills, provide evidence that 
when such recontextualisation occurs, it is on a time scale of years. Byrne (1993) points out that 
interventions designed to instill domain-general skills are typically ineffective, but that programmes 
intended to enhance higher-order thinking in specific domains are more usually successful. These effects 
are, however, restricted to the domain that was the focus of instruction. 
On this evidence then, even when a well-elaborated conceptual framework has been developed, 
generalisation beyond the domain to which that framework applies may be a long time coming, if it comes at 
all: i.e. there is a considerable tendency of knowledge towards compartmentalisation. It is instructive to 
contrast this with road safety training materials which begin from a focus on generalisation, in the hope that 
children will spontaneously extend what they understand in one context to another (e.g. comparison of the 
boundaries of classroom furniture to the kerbside, or training in observation skills within the classroom). 
Even if transfer of some kind does occur under these circumstances, the potential for misunderstanding 
which correspondences are salient is rife. Moreover, as the research in Chapter 2 indicates, it is in fact the 
case that even relatively small shifts in the context of road safety instruction (e.g., from street to traffic 
garden) can result in measurable decrements in useful learning. This provides a timely reminder that what 
constitutes a unitary domain to a child may, in fact, be even more restricted than we as adults might realise. 
The implication then is that it would be better to focus on promoting development from scratch in the area in 
hand, and aim for self-contained advance (i.e. with circumscribed calls to outside knowledge). In the context 
of education more generally, where it can be argued that a major aim is to draw connections between 
different areas of knowledge, this approach might seem less than desirable. However, in road safety 
education, where the priority is the promotion of necessary pedestrian skills as rapidly and effectively as 
possible, everything would seem to point to this being the best way to proceed. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter began by posing the question of why it was that methods involving practical training appeared 
to be the most effective means of instructing children in pedestrian skills. The survey of the main strands of 
developmental theory presented in Section 3.2 suggested that answer is that it is because they adhere to and 
so facilitate the natural progression of learning from specific actions to more general concepts; and more 
specifically that they almost inevitably make use of the underlying mechanisms of learning. In a nutshell, 
skills and strategies cannot be taught solely by verbal means but must be built up from their constituent 
behaviours. 
Having established this point, we went on to consider the issue of whether there are any inherent constraints 
on the timing and rate of learning that might have implications for the application of a training programme 
based on this principle. It was noted that previous assumptions about age-related constraints are based on a 
misconception of Piagetian theory, and that there is good evidence that learning is much more flexible than 
supposed, especially when appropriate interventions are employed. Whilst it would perhaps be misleading to 
state that there is no bottom age at which training would be effective, there is certainly good reason to 
suppose that it could begin as early as 4 years of age. 
Finally, it was also noted that there is on the other hand considerable evidence for a previously little-
recognised constraint, namely a tendency for learning to be domain-specific or compartmentalised. This 
suggests that road safety education can ill afford to assume any carry over from other areas of knowledge. It 
is important that training takes place within circumstances closely related to the ultimate context of use. The 
next chapter goes on to consider in more detail what developmental research has to offer apropos the 
methods such training ought to espouse. 
Chapter 4 
Implications of developmental theory for training 
4.1 Relevance of developmental theory 
Developmental theory provides clear indications as to why practical training in pedestrian skills has been 
found to be more effective than classroom approaches. It also suggests that, provided the focus is on 
promoting appropriate action using close analogues of the road environment, there is no reason why 
effective training should not begin with children of age 5 or even younger. However, we still need 
information about the precise format and methods of training that would be most effective. Here again, 
developmental theories (particularly contemporary extensions of the work of Piaget and Vygotsky) provide a 
framework for addressing this issue. 
On the face of it, Piagetian and Vygotskian theory suggest rather different mechanisms for promoting 
development. For Piaget, the most important element is the experience of conflict between ideas and 
experience, or between one's own ideas and those of others as revealed during dialogue, since it is such 
conflict which promotes coordination. In other words, progress is held to occur through the internal 
resolution of externally-induced conflict. Whilst its potential importance has not been widely recognised 
until recently, there is good reason to suppose that discussion may be of particular value here. This is 
because it provides a greater scope for conflict (and its resolution) as a result of the ability of language to 
refer to aspects of the universe beyond those immediately present. Moreover, discussion may also serve to 
promote specific decentrations, since dialogue has the capacity for explicitly drawing attention to different, 
but related structures or schemes. In fact, Piaget and Inhelder (1956) directly emphasise the central role that 
social interaction might play in the growth of decentration. 
It is important to note, however, that there are restrictions on the conditions under which dialogue would be 
useful. Not only is there an implicit requirement for participants to hold differing perspectives, but it is also 
likely to be the case that peer discussion will be considerably more effective than that between, say, an adult 
and a child. In the first place, peers will show a greater tendency to use the same type of language to refer to 
the same things, and are more likely to find the same aspects of experience to be salient. In addition, there 
are also relevant social effects: peers are more likely to question each other and to discuss competing 
perspectives. Adult-child interaction is more likely to result in the adult putting forward his/her own view for 
the child to accept, and the child acquiescing whether they understand or not.  
In contrast to this, for Vygotsky, the central mechanism of learning is the guidance of action, especially via 
contingent, "corrective" dialogue (cf. 3.2 above). The main constraint is that the external construction of 
activity should take place within the zone of proximal development of the less able, i.e. that it must build on 
the child's existing capabilities. Assuming that this condition is met, joint activity of this kind will eventually 
become internalised as the interpsychological operation becomes established at an intrapsychological level.  
Despite the obvious differences it is not necessary to suppose that these mechanisms are mutually exclusive, 
especially given the complementarity of Vygotskian and Piagetian theory identified in Section 3.2. In both 
cases, there is an emphasis on the importance of social interaction - on interactive learning - and there is 
evidence that the two operate as alternative processes within interaction. From one viewpoint, this leaves it 
simply as a matter of empirical research to identify which is more likely to occur and to be productive under 
what circumstances. However, a strong case can be made that the Vygotskian approach is particularly suited 
to the learning of actions, whereas the Piagetian approach better facilitates conceptual advance. In part, this 
is a reflection of differences in the natural focus of the two theories. For instance, it seems intuitively 
plausible that the acquisition of practical skills will occur most naturally via interpersonal guidance and 
transfer (i.e. some form of apprenticeship model). On the other hand, understanding the reasoning that lies 
behind practical action seems to emerge most naturally as a result of task-centred debate, especially where 
individuals have slightly different perspectives (note that this could concern both strategic knowledge and 
more abstract concepts). 
This idea of a natural ambit for the two theories is backed up by a considerable amount of evidence since the 
Vygotskian and Piagetian approaches map well on to specific types of established educational activity, 
namely peer (or adult-led) tutoring and peer collaboration respectively. Research on these two techniques 
provides a sizeable body of literature on which to draw vis-à-vis the operation of training and instruction 
methods and the circumstances under which they are effective. This chapter examines each in turn before 
considering what they have to offer in the specific context of road safety education. 
4.2 Peer tutoring 
Peer tutoring refers to a dyadic interaction in which one partner who is the more competent, tutors the other, 
less competent partner. The asymmetry of this relationship meets the basic condition required by Vygotsky 
for establishing the zone of proximal development, although it must be acknowledged that this in itself does 
not guarantee that the learning process that he describes will inevitably occur. However, research addressing 
the processes and outcomes of peer tutoring is on the whole supportive, indicating positive effects on 
learning in line with what would be expected, and defining conditions which appear to be favourable for the 
facilitation of learning which are again consistent with Vygotskian theory. 
For instance, some indication of the effectiveness of peer tutoring is provided by studies which have utilised 
Piagetian conservation tasks, in which a conserving child has been paired with a non-conserver. Under this 
arrangement, non-conservers have typically been found to progress to the level of conservation (Ames and 
Murray, 1982; Murray, 1972; Perret-Clermont and Schubauer-Leoni, 1981). Moreover, this does not seem to 
be a function simply of interaction per se: in a study by Tudge (1992), only those non-conservers paired with 
conservers advanced following interaction. This would suggest that the differing level of competence of the 
partners is a crucial factor in the success of the interactive session. 
As far as it goes, this suggests that peer tutoring might be better understood in terms of Vygotskian than 
Piagetian theory. Tudge certainly interprets his findings in this way, and also suggests that pairing with a 
more competent partner is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for development. The more able 
partner, he argues, must also introduce reasoning to the discussion at an appropriate level for the tutee to 
understand, and the tutee must accept this reasoning (Tudge, 1992). This is, of course, consistent with 
Vygotsky's requirement that the dialogue of the more advanced individual remain within the zone of 
proximal development of the less advanced. 
Despite this evidence, it is not possible to eliminate a Piagetian account of these effects, since the more 
experienced partner may have induced conflict in the less experienced partner, and it may be the resolution 
of this that led to the cognitive advance. It is therefore important that Azmitia (1988) provides further 
support of the Vygotskian interpretation. This author also found that peer collaboration led to greater 
learning in preschool children when they were paired with a more competent partner. However, Azmitia 
reports that analysis of the interactive episodes revealed that the learning was mediated mainly by 
observation and guidance of action, and not by cognitive conflict as would be required by Piagetian theory. 
This is consistent with Vygotsky's idea of the importance of "corrective dialogue" in the process of 
interaction with a more competent other.  
Research has, however, indicated other factors that may have a mediating influence on the success of peer 
tutoring, and any attempt to assess its usefulness as an educational strategy must take these into account. In 
addition to the tutor possessing greater competence in the particular domain of learning, and being able to 
introduce reasoning at a level suited to the understanding of the tutee, a number of authors have suggested 
that peer tutoring may be more suited to some tasks than to others.  
Thus, in a review of peer mediated and teacher mediated learning, Greenwood, Carta and Kamps (1990) 
point to the limitations of peer tutoring as a method of teaching high level conceptual skills. In support of 
this, the authors cite evidence from Greenwood, Delaquadri and Hall (1984) to show that peer tutoring 
improved performance on reading comprehension, but that this improvement depended on the learning of 
rote skills such as oral reading, spelling and reading rate. Similarly, we might note, apropos those studies 
which examined the role of peer tutoring in promoting conservation, that it is to some extent unclear whether 
what was acquired by initial non-conservers was a genuine conceptual grasp or simply a series of 
appropriate responses to a specific task. Also consistent with this line of argument is the assertion of Damon 
(1984) that peer tutoring is best suited to tasks which are rule-governed and which concentrate on the 
exchange of skills and information. Damon and Phelps (1989) conclude that peer tutoring is most effective 
when applied to learning a skill which has been partially acquired but not yet mastered. Again, though, these 
points are all consistent with the general tenor of Vygotskian theory, as outlined in earlier sections.  
In the present context, however, one further issue of particular significance is highlighted by reports of 
apparent limitations in children's role-taking abilities, tailoring of verbal direction, and sensitivity to others. 
So, for example, Peterson, Danner and Flavell (1972) found that young children lack the skills of knowing 
what form of help is required by the other, and have trouble ascertaining the nature of the problem (see also 
Foot, Shute, Morgan and Barron, 1990). Furthermore, children make less use of verbal explanation in the 
tutoring process than do adults, with adults tending more often to give information regarding processes, 
rationale and purpose (Ellis and Rogoff, 1982; Mehen, 1977). Given other parallels between peer tutoring 
and adult-child interaction, it seems worthwhile exploring the possibility that the latter might actually be 
more effective.  
4.3 Adult-led tutoring 
Certainly, as Rogoff (1986) points out, adult-child interaction can be regarded as being as much of a step 
away from the traditional direct instruction model as peer tutoring. She considers the interaction to be one of 
"guided participation", which again has similarities to the Vygotskian notion of the corrective dialogue. As 
already implied, one of the potential strengths of adult-child interaction is the degree of tutoring skill that an 
adult may have in comparison to that of a child. For instance, adults tend to be more sensitive to the 
misunderstandings of the tutee, and may be better able to respond to requests for help (Foot et al., 1990). In 
their discussion of the processes of interactive learning, Tudge and Rogoff (1989) conclude that adults are 
particularly effective partners when promoting skills in which they are expert. So, for example, 
Radziswewska and Rogoff (1991) found that 9 year-old children gained more skill in errand planning 
through collaboration with parents than with peers. 
The competence of the partner (in terms of both task-specific and more general tutoring skills), and the 
locating of the discourse within the less able partner's zone of proximal development appear, then, to be the 
crucial factors. In the context of road safety education, this would suggest that adult-child interaction has the 
potential to make concrete the skills involved in road crossing, and thus to provide an important element 
within a programme of practical training (cf. the research referred to in Chapter 2 on adult-led training of 
visual timing judgements and safe place finding). This might be especially so if use were made of trained 
adults who have sufficient understanding of the child's capabilities to pitch their behaviour so that it falls 
within the zone of proximal development.  
In this regard, Wood (1986) not only emphasises the role played by adult tutors in "scaffolding" children's 
performance on concrete tasks (and hence their acquisition of relevant skills), he also identifies a general 
principle underlying successful tutoring, namely varying the degree of guidance that is given according to 
the tutee's behaviour. According to Wood, tutors have available to them five possible levels of guidance. In 
order of increasing specificity these are: general verbal prompts; specific verbal instructions; indication of 
key materials; preparation of materials ready for action; and demonstration of action. Effective tutors begin 
the session employing the most general level of guidance, but increase the level of specificity whenever the 
tutee is unsuccessful, and increase the level of generality whenever the tutee is successful. In essence, when 
this system is employed the tutor's input is tailored to provide support and guidance where it is most needed, 
and within the zone of proximal development. However, it should also be noted that Wood does report 
difficulties in training adults to use these techniques in a consistent fashion, indicating a need for further 
research.  
Finally, Wood's work also has some interesting implications for resourcing issues. Superficially at least, one 
potential limitation on the adoption of adult-led training in this format would be the time constraints that 
would arise out of using it on a one-to-one basis. However, Wood's model of contingent control was derived 
in part from observation of expert tutors in the classroom context. This suggests that it ought to be possible 
to operate it in a "time-sharing" mode, at least with small groups of children, without effectiveness being 
greatly impeded. Whether this is in fact the case in the context of road safety education is a matter for further 
research, but the work of Thomson et al. (1992) on small-group training in safe place location does provide 
some support for this notion. 
4.4 Peer collaboration 
Peer collaboration refers to a situation in which the interaction between peers is not as structured as in a 
tutoring session, but involves individuals working together to establish a joint solution to a specified 
problem. Furthermore, peer collaboration as a descriptive term is equally applicable both to the group 
situation (typically involving somewhere between three and six individuals) and to that of a dyadic 
interaction. Unlike peer tutoring, peer collaboration does not stress the importance of different levels of 
competence, although there is evidence to suggest that different perspectives may be important in the 
success of collaborative work among peers. Howe, Rodgers and Tolmie (1990), for example, found in two 
separate studies that conceptual advance in primary school children was increased by group interaction 
where group members differed in their initial viewpoints, but not where these were the same. Crucially, in 
half of these cases groups had been composed so that, although individuals differed in the content of their 
ideas, they were at equal levels of competence as measured against objective criteria. 
Findings of this kind not only suggest that the processes mediating advancement through peer collaboration 
may be different from those operating in peer tutoring, but also provide specific impetus to the Piagetian 
account. Consistent with Piaget, Howe et al. placed considerable emphasis within their tasks on exchange 
and negotiation, and on the importance of the group trying to achieve a joint solution, because it was 
anticipated that this would promote dialogue about ideas and impressions, allowing differences between 
these to serve as fuel for individual advance. Similarly, a number of other researchers have also reported that 
when two novices work together under the same kind of task conditions as employed by Howe et al. they 
advance more than they do when working alone (e.g. Doise and Mugny, 1979; Emler and Valiant, 1982; 
Damon and Phelps, 1989; Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton, 1980). The one limitation to many of these 
studies is that they concentrated on outcome measures, and as such failed to provide adequate information to 
clarify the processes by which observed improvements were mediated. 
Doise and Mugny (1984), in fact, suggest that the processes involved in collaborative learning are, at least in 
part, in line with Vygotsky's theoretical position. They consider conflict to be a crucial motivating factor 
(hence the importance of individuals bringing different perspectives to the task), but in the sense that this 
socio-cognitive conflict forces the participants into the formation of a joint resolution. This joint 
understanding, they argue, is then internalised by the learners in a manner which is consistent with 
Vygotsky's notion of the shift from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning. 
Howe, Tolmie and Rodgers (1992), however, provided important evidence to suggest that this is in fact not 
the process by which development is mediated in group collaboration, at least at primary school level. Their 
study examined different groups of children working together on a task relating to the motion of objects 
down an incline. The authors reported positive effects following collaboration, but there were two points 
which indicated that internalisation of jointly constructed understanding could not be the mechanism at 
work. The first of these was that in the group sessions there was little sign of any joint understanding being 
established. The second was that on an immediate post-test the performance of group members was no better 
than at pre-test; it was only on a delayed post-test a number of weeks later that the performance of children 
was found to have improved, and careful questioning revealed that this was, moreover, not attributable to 
them having engaged in any relevant activity in the interim. 
On this evidence, then, the effects of collaborative work are indeed best interpreted in Piagetian terms, with 
conceptual advance being seen as a result of the private resolution of cognitive conflict generated by the 
airing of different ideas within the task itself. When seen in this light, the role of group discussion would be 
primarily to serve as a catalyst for change. Further evidence in favour of this is provided by Howe et al. 
(1992a), who found that one type of group with different perspectives did not show increased advance. It 
was noted afterwards that, despite their differences in understanding, these individuals would have tended 
nonetheless to have arrived at the same solutions to the problems the group was working on, and thus would 
have had no basis for realising that they did differ. In other words, dialogue will only be effective if conflicts 
are actually identified. 
Similar support is provided by Tolmie and Howe (1993), who report on a study which examined the effects 
of collaborative work on secondary school pupils' understanding of the trajectories followed by falling 
objects. It was found in this case that measures of the degree of initial difference between participants' 
understanding predicted both the amount of in-group discussion of different explanations and the extent of 
pre- to post-test conceptual advance. Again, Tolmie, Howe, Mackenzie and Greer (1993) found that when 
group discussion amongst primary school children was left to follow its own course, conceptual advance 
was strongly predicted by the amount of in-group discussion of different ideas, but only at a delayed post-
test eleven weeks later. A related effect is reported by Webb and Kenderski (1984), who found that the 
children who showed the greatest benefits of interaction were those who gave explanations to their peers 
most frequently. 
Evidence for the importance of dialogue in learning is also provided by studies of the effect of friendship on 
the success of collaborative work. Aboud (1985) and Nelson and Aboud (1985), for instance, found that 
friends collaborate better than non-friends. More recently Azmitia and Montgomery (1993) found that 
friends benefitted more from collaboration than did acquaintances, although this effect was only evident on 
more challenging tasks. In particular, though, these authors noted that collaborating friends engaged in more 
"transactive dialogue" than acquaintances, this referring to the exchange of ideas, criticisms, explanations 
and elaborations. The authors concluded that this was the most important factor in determining the higher 
level of performance. That Kruger and Tomasello (1986) and Kruger (1993) have found that adult-child 
partnerships rarely produce as much transactive dialogue as peer dyads, serves once again to highlight 
differences in the processes implicated in peer collaboration and in tutoring sessions. 
It is important to note, however, that there are reasons to suppose that the impact of dialogue within 
collaborative work has the potential to extend beyond that of merely generating cognitive conflict. For 
Piaget, connections and coordinations depended on the child having access to different possible 
perspectives, and this access was in turn strictly dependent on conscious thought (cf. 3.2 above). One 
implication of this is that the discussion of ideas might actually serve to encapsulate specific perspectives in 
an explicit and manipulable form (i.e. fuelling decentration). Where discussion is rather disordered, as may 
often happen when primary school children are left to follow their own course, this may reduce to an effect 
of conflict, with subsequent progress dictated by the extent to which the child is able to make productive 
coordinations amongst the different elements which have been thrown up. Where greater order is imposed, 
however, dialogue may have the capacity to signal in relatively direct fashion something of what those 
coordinations should be. 
Consistent with this, Tolmie et al. (1993) found that when groups of children were required as part of their 
activity to generate running summaries of their conclusions, advance was no longer predicted by the amount 
of discussion about different ideas, but by the quality of those summaries. It should be stressed that this was 
not the kind of process outlined by Vygotskian theory (cf. Doise and Mugny, 1984), since the effects were 
still not apparent until a delayed post-test. It was not, then, that children were internalising a joint 
construction, but rather that they were making private constructions along lines which had been signalled by 
resolutions achieved in-group. 
What this indicates further is that at root everything may hinge upon task construction. In general terms, 
Tolmie et al. (1993) demonstrated that by constructing tasks in a certain manner it is possible to shape 
dialogue to achieve specified educational goals. That this is possible is not in itself a new assertion: Webb 
(1989), for instance, also suggested that interaction could be structured so as to promote the giving of 
explanations. Again, that task format had such a profound influence on dialogue, which in turn affected 
learning, is in part simply more support for the notion that dialogue is a central feature in collaborative 
learning. However, what this study revealed in addition is that it is not necessarily the extent of dialogue that 
is important, but the quality of discussion of relevant factors and what use this is put to. The finding that 
tasks can be structured so as to yield control over this aspect of collaborative work is extremely important 
both for future research and for the implementation of these techniques. 
Finally, the question remains as to whether there are particular tasks and areas of learning which are best 
suited to the use of peer collaboration. In the previous section, evidence was presented which suggested that 
tutoring procedures were better suited to the learning of skills or to enhancing performance on tasks which 
are essentially rule-governed and do not require the development of new conceptual understanding. In 
contrast, the work of Howe and colleagues (Howe et al., 1990, 1992a,b; Tolmie and Howe, 1993; Tolmie et 
al., 1993) demonstrates the efficacy of peer collaboration for promoting conceptual advance. 
Damon and Phelps (1988) examined this issue more directly by presenting dyads of 9 and 10 year-old 
children with a series of mathematical, spatial and physical tasks. They found progress following interaction, 
but the gains were restricted to certain tasks. Improvement was reported on ratio and proportion tasks, 
perspective taking tasks and problems involving ratios and equilibrium. There were no gains on addition, 
subtraction and model building tasks. In other words, the tasks where collaboration had produced benefits 
were those which required children to grasp new insights and concepts; tasks which depended more on 
specific instructions and accurate reproduction skills showed little effect. This finding was in line with the 
analysis of different interactive learning structures carried out by Damon and Phelps (1987), who concluded 
that peer collaboration was likely to be particularly suited to the advancing of conceptual understanding. 
Note, however, that the focus of collaborative tasks addressed at conceptual advance is still directed towards 
action of some kind. It is crucial to recognise that there is no evidence that discussion in the abstract would 
be effective. The key elements of dialogue for collaborative learning arise not in isolation, but out of 
attempts to decide between conflicting proposals for the solution to a concrete problem i.e. as part of a 
process of justification (c.f. Howe et al., 1992a). Where this explication of concepts as relevant to action 
does occur, however, all the indications are that it has immense potential for sparking robust, useful 
learning. Whilst there is little evidence as yet of how this potential might translate into improved 
performance in the specific context of pedestrian tasks, it is worth noting that the theoretical account of peer 
collaboration offered above goes a long way to explain why Thomson et al. (1992) found group-based 
training that included peer commentary to produce learning which showed no decrement over time. 
4.5 The practicalities of interactive learning 
Overall, then, there does appear to be considerable educational benefit to be gained from careful 
implementation of interactive learning techniques. In theoretical terms, the available evidence suggests that 
both Piagetian notions of conflict and coordination and Vygotskian ideas of co-construction in the zone of 
proximal development are implicated in interactive learning, but that tutoring is more suited to a Vygotskian 
analysis whilst peer collaboration is more in line with Piagetian theory. 
In more practical terms, there is also evidence that both peer tutoring and the guided participation involved 
in adult-child interaction are likely to be best suited to the learning of skills. However, since younger 
children may find peer tutoring problematic as a result of difficulties in adopting the roles required by the 
interaction, a programme of adult-child interaction is likely to be of more use with this age group. Although 
this requires a sensitive approach on the part of the adult tutor (cf. Wood's points on shifts in the level of 
guidance provided by tutors), together with an ability to operate within the understanding of the child, the 
evidence suggests that in areas of relative expertise this may be to some extent spontaneously forthcoming 
(cf. Thomson, 1993). 
Peer collaboration, on the other hand, would appear to be more useful in the promotion of conceptual 
advance. In the collaborative situation, when children work together they are more likely to engage in the 
productive exchange of ideas detailed by Piagetian theory than when they work with adults, since they share 
the same language. This does not mean relinquishing control of the learning process, however, since careful 
task design will enable much of the character of the group's dialogue to be determined by the educator. Nor 
should there be any problems with regard to group composition. Admittedly, the success of peer 
collaboration is dependent upon participants having differing perspectives, and this might seem at first sight 
to present practical difficulties vis à vis deciding which children to put together. However, Tolmie et al., 
(1993) and Howe, Tolmie, Greer and Mackenzie (in press) have both shown that the necessary degree of 
difference can usually be achieved via random allocation. In fact, the findings of Azmitia and Montgomery 
(1993) point to an even more practical conclusion, namely that the most productive option is likely to be to 
let children work in friendship groups. 
There is no doubt, however, that the structuring of the group both in terms of composition and, more 
importantly, task set is crucial to the effectiveness of the interactive learning approach, especially with 
young children. Apart from anything else, structuring is necessary to ensure that each child can make a 
contribution to the group goal and, in so doing, to create conditions for children to become immersed in the 
group activity. Studies of children's naturalistic interaction reveal that only 13-16% of their interaction time 
is cooperative or helpful (Hertz-Lazarowitz, 1990; Hertz-Lazarowitz, Fuchs, Sharabany & Eisenberg, 1989). 
Even in cooperative work groups only 16% of all dialogue involves sharing knowledge and providing or 
receiving explanations (Bennett, l99l). By contrast, appropriate structuring of the group activity can serve to 
promote much more frequent speech in individual children - speech which involves the exchange of 
information, giving help, offering explanations, asking questions, seeking clarification and elaboration. All 
of these play an important role in children's intellectual functioning (King 1990; Sharan & Shachar, 1988; 
Webb, Ender & Lewis, 1986). 
The effective use of peer collaboration therefore hinges upon the appropriate organisation of the group's 
activities. An instructional programme for road safety would need to guide the teacher clearly in how to 
structure the children's dialogue and debate, according to the age and level of understanding that the children 
have reached. The teacher would also need to be briefed in how to set up conditions and activities which are 
challenging and which will provoke debate, question-posing, justification, explanation and elaboration. 
Children may be quite astute at spotting contradictions and disagreements between each others' points of 
view but they are not necessarily adept at generating the kinds of discussion around such conflicts that we 
know to be productive. 
Given this kind of resource cost, it it is perhaps important to emphasise that there are considerable practical 
advantages to peer-based learning methods over more traditional whole-class teacher-led instructional 
methods. 
 Interactive learning enables class teachers to manage large numbers of pupils while ensuring that their 
time is spent productively in learning activities (Sharan, 1990). Children are typically assigned to dyads 
or small groups to work on relevant tasks while teachers move among the groups to offer assistance and 
monitor progress. Teachers using traditional instruction methods present information as if the class was 
homogeneous with respect to their skills, ability and motivation. They often have little time to interact 
with individual children and facilitate learning because of the need to manage behaviour and maintain 
discipline (Kagan, l986). 
 Interactive learning methods encourage children to be fully participative members of small work groups 
and to work together, taking responsibility for their own learning as well as helping to move the group 
forward (Johnson and Johnson, l990). 
 Such methods encourage children to assist, guide and support others by sharing information and ideas 
while working together on a group task. There is considerable evidence that group work encourages a 
high degree of engagement in the group task which promotes cognitive effort and social relationships 
within the group (Damon and Phelps, 1987; 1989; Sharan and Shaulov, 1991). 
 Interactive learning has a positive effect on pupils' classroom behaviour, producing a decline in pupils' 
boredom and disruptive behaviour (Hertz-Lazarowitz & Shachar, l990). These changes may be 
attributed to the children's involvement in making decisions which affect their own work and to the shift 
in the teachers' role in offering guidance rather than in directing them. 
These points are as yet still very general. It remains necessary to identify how adult-child interaction and 
peer collaboration could actually form the basis of specific educational applications in the road safety 
context. This task is addressed in the remainder of the chapter. 
4.6 Implementing interactive training strategies in the context of road safety 
The first part of this chapter established the educational potential of the class of techniques known 
collectively as interactive learning. More specifically we identified adult-led, guided participation as 
particularly appropriate to skills training whereas peer collaboration is especially appropriate to the 
promoting of conceptual understanding. Given the identified need for road safety education to impart both 
skills and the conceptual framework for deployment of those skills, the implication is that it could benefit 
from carefully structured implementation of some of the principles of interactive learning. 
From this point of view, a complementary programme of adult-child interaction and peer collaboration 
would seem to be the most promising avenue to pursue. Adult-child interaction could be employed to 
develop practical roadside skills using a hierarchical progression from relatively simple tasks, such as 
crossing a quiet street, to the more complex action plans and strategies needed to interact with busier roads 
and more complex traffic layouts. The fact that skill development is best undertaken in the roadside context 
is another reason for taking an adult-led approach to such learning, since the adults are required anyway for 
safety reasons. On the other hand, there is no reason why group discussion and argument should not be 
included as part of the training procedure, with the adult taking more of a background role in order to 
promote group collaboration.  
Such a programme of guided participation could therefore be backed up by related group work, not just at 
the time but also later in an appropriate classroom context, where the aim would be to broaden the children's 
conceptual understanding beyond the concrete situations encountered at the roadside. Two issues are critical 
here, however. Firstly, the roadside visits are absolutely crucial, because they provide a context which the 
children can 'bring back' to the classroom with them. This greatly improves the chances that when the 
teacher refers to road situations, traffic actions, and so on, the children will know what she and everyone else 
is referring to. This 'shared cognition' is indispensable because, without it, there would be little common 
ground and therefore insufficient focus for the classroom activities. Secondly, it is essential that the 
classroom activities used to develop the roadside work should also provide as meaningful a context as 
possible. This maximises the chances of the children generalising their experiences at the roadside to the 
new context. Table-top models of traffic layouts have been successfully used to do this but other materials, 
such as videos, might well establish a suitable classroom context for at least some activities. When used 
conjunctively in this way, the two strands of practical and classroom activities could be expected, over time, 
to promote the development of a relatively sophisticated model of traffic that could guide practical action in 
a wide range of situations - including many that had never been encountered in real traffic.  
4.7 Examples of training 
In order to lay the foundations for developing an integrated educational programme in the road safety 
domain, it is necessary to set out in more detail how the principles that have been described could be 
operationalised in practical educational ways, and how classroom and other activities could be structured 
accordingly. We are not attempting here to specify any kind of training package but rather to provide an 
example of the kinds of activities that could be developed. To do this, we will consider the case of safe place 
finding which seems to pose a considerable conceptual challenge to younger children but which nevertheless 
appears to be amenable to training. Other skills could be addressed in a similar way, with appropriate 
modifications to the general procedure.  
4.71 Road-side activities 
The rationale for teaching children at an early stage how to recognise dangerous roadside locations and how 
to find safer ones has already been discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. Although it has generally been 
assumed that children can do this, recent research has shown that children under the age of about nine show 
little insight into what constitutes a dangerous crossing site, typically regarding such sites as perfectly safe 
(Ampofo-Boateng and Thomson, 1991). Thus, crossing between parked vehicles, on the brow of a hill, or at 
a sharp bend are regarded as safe activities by most younger children. 
A strong case has already been made that dealing with these errors in abstract terms is unlikely to be 
effective. Road-side training programmes are therefore needed which take children through the practicalities 
of safe place finding, and which adopt a structured learning approach focusing on the most common errors 
made by young children. The aim would be to help the children discover what is dangerous about such 
situations through their own rather than through our reasoning. There is thus no question of simply issuing 
children with a 'list' of places to be avoided. There is so much variation in the form that dangerous sites can 
take that such an approach would be ineffective. However, by promoting conceptual understanding and 
appropriate reasoning strategies, children can be taught how to deal with any such situation, not just those 
figuring on the 'list'. The difference between these approaches is fundamental. 
In promoting recognition of what is dangerous about some locations and safe about others, it is likely that a 
good deal of adult guidance would be required, at least in the early stages. However, the use of group 
training at the road-side would also afford opportunities for the benefits of collaborative work to play a part. 
It seems likely that this would be particularly useful once the children had begun to develop some 
rudimentary understanding of the problem. At this stage, it is likely that differences of perspective would 
develop among the children, the exploration of which would generate the necessary conflict for conceptual 
advance to emerge within the individuals in the group. This would suggest that the first sessions might be 
primarily adult-led, with the balance towards collaborative work increasing as the programme continues. 
Translating this into action, the trainer might proceed as follows. At each location a child could be selected 
from the group and asked to indicate where it would be safe to cross to a specified destination. The other 
group members could then be asked individually to comment on the proposed route, opening up a discussion 
about the best route. Training would continue with the teacher/responsible adult encouraging the children to 
consider issues such as visibility from the chosen crossing point; whether the position permits the pedestrian 
to see far enough ahead; what 'far enough ahead' means in the present context; whether or not this could be 
improved by moving elsewhere; and so on. By judicious use of questions, prompts and praise trainers could 
discreetly direct the group in particular directions without imposing their own point of view too heavily and 
thus without undermining the group discussion. When eventually an acceptable solution were found, the 
group could then move to a new site: if no acceptable solution were forthcoming, the trainer would 
eventually have to demonstrate a good route, explain why it would be more suitable than the others, and 
encourage the children to make similar choices at future locations. However, in order to maximise the 
children's own input, it would be necessary to use such intervention only as a last resort. On the other hand, 
it would help define the standard which the children are expected to aim for and could be useful in this 
regard. 
At future sites, it would be important to select a different child to make the primary judgements so that all 
the children would be given the opportunity both to propose routes and be discussants of other people's 
proposals. This would maximise their experience by forcing them to consider the problem from the various 
perspectives offered by other children (or the trainer). It would also help to avoid the adoption of fixed roles 
within the group, such as the emergence of dominant and submissive partners. 
In order for all members of the group to have an equal chance of participating, whilst at the same time 
ensuring that there are several perspectives to debate, it would seem sensible to use group sizes of between 
three and five children. Larger groups should certainly be avoided in the case of roadside visits because of 
the safety implications, unless two or more trainers are available. Smaller groups would obviously reveal 
fewer perspectives (or, indeed, no difference of perspective at all). More details of how to structure group 
activities around these themes are given in Thomson et al. (1992) and Ampofo-Boateng et al. (1993). 
This training approach is highly realistic to the children; it invokes all the desirable elements of a fully 
engaging debate, challenging the children's own perspectives and encouraging them to discover and learn 
about the difficulties associated with their own choices of action. It also provides the context for 
understanding that their peers may have different and perhaps better ideas and that the perspectives of other 
road users, like drivers, have to be taken into account. Above all, this structured approach is aimed at 
teaching children the principles underlying safe actions and procedures and actively discourages them from 
thinking that road safety education is about adhering to drills or sets of rigid rules. 
4.72 Classroom-based activities 
Once children have been exposed to the practicalities of the road-side, there is much work that could be 
carried back into the classroom. The actual situations they have confronted could be translated into a range 
of classroom exercises, some addressing traffic situations similar to those that were actually experienced, 
others extrapolated from them. This supporting programme would be best constructed around collaborative 
group work aimed at further developing the children's conceptual understanding on the basis of their existing 
concrete experience. As already indicated, it would be necessary for these activities to take place in as 
meaningful a context as possible so that the children could extrapolate their road side experience to the new 
situations. In the case of teaching safe route finding, one possibility would be to use table-top street models 
with houses, vehicles, miniature doll-pedestrians, and so on that can be used to create quite a realistic (and 
highly popular) traffic environment. Such contexts are visually attractive to young children, can be carefully 
controlled, and enable the trainer to contrive tasks around which group discussion can be structured. There is 
no need for the models to closely resemble the road environment that the children visited previously, except 
insofar as bends, obscuring obstacles, intersections and so on can be set up on it. Such models have already 
proved effective in improving children's safe place finding skills and appear to have validity as training 
devices when 'primed' by a small amount of experience at the roadside (Ampofo-Boateng & Thomson, 1991; 
Thomson et al., l992; Ampofo-Boateng et al., 1993).  
It seems likely that interactive learning could be developed around other tasks designed for classroom use 
such as photographic, video or computer-based materials. These could be used to illustrate a variety of 
potential crossing sites such as bends, hills, parked cars and intersections of different kinds. Little evaluative 
work has been done on the effectiveness of such materials in the context of the skills under discussion, but it 
seems likely that they would have a useful role to play, if used sensibly. On the positive side, videos and 
slides/photographs increase the realism of the scenes relative to models. On the negative side, the children 
would likely be involved in a more passive role when using such materials, which could be a disadvantage 
of such materials relative to models. Of course, different materials could be used for different purposes - for 
example, videos permit children to observe dynamic events which would obviously be harder to contrive 
using models. With models, on the other hand, it is easier to get children to choose routes or to build a safer 
location by reconstructing the road layout and so on. Thus, different materials could be used to emphasise 
different aspects of pedestrian competence, which would seem to be important in producing the rounded 
experience that the child required. Research should obviously be directed at how different materials of this 
kind could be deployed in developing different aspects of pedestrian skill in children of different ages. 
The value of classroom exercises in complementing road-side practical training is, firstly, that they can be 
developed to present challenges and group activities to children in many different structured ways, and, 
secondly, that they can encompass a much wider range of potential crossing situations than practical road-
side training could possibly achieve. They can therefore help in developing more general experience and 
understanding as the children seek to generalise the skills they learned at the road-side. The road-side 
experience is paramount, however, in setting the overall context for such learning and in ensuring that the 
real world continues to form the framework within which children's conceptual development takes place. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter we have explored the merits of two approaches to learning which might be employed to 
promote pedestrian competence: those in which the child learns by working with a more experienced other 
(usually, though not necessarily, an adult); and those in which they learn for themselves by working with 
other children of similar age and experience. Both approaches promote learning, but it seems that the former 
is best suited to developing underlying skills and strategies whereas the latter is particularly useful in 
promoting conceptual understanding. Since both are necessary to the development of traffic competence, it 
would seem appropriate that both approaches be incorporated into any training programme. Since practical 
roadside training must be adult-led, if only for safety reasons, it seems sensible that roadside sessions should 
be devoted to the skill and strategic elements of road safety education - although there is no reason, in 
principle, why more conceptual issues should not be addressed there as well. However, the advantage of 
classroom activities is that they can complement roadside training by creating scenarios that go far beyond 
what the children would be able to experience directly in real traffic. They would also provide a platform for 
collaborative work and for the promotion of conceptual understanding for which this technique is 
particularly useful. We have discussed some of the ways in which roadside and classroom activities might be 
structured to accommodate these complementary educational approaches. However, more research should be 
directed at how this might best be done.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Before making specific recommendations with regard to future research, we would like to emphasise a 
number of more global points that cut across those recommendations and form the context for them. 
1. We consider the specifying of a general theoretical framework to be an indispensable requirement in the 
effort to develop effective and coherent educational countermeasures. In the absence of such a framework, 
countermeasures are never more than ad hoc. The lack of a serious and explicitly-stated theoretical rationale 
is, we believe, at the heart of the sense of malaise that is currently detectable in the field. Our aim has been 
to propose a rationale which, we believe, would meet with general approval both from developmental 
psychology and educational science. Whether it meets with approval from within the road safety field 
remains to be seen. 
2. It is important that far more consideration should be given to behaviour: that is, to what different groups 
of pedestrian actually do in traffic. Since the overall aim of road safety education is to get children to behave 
in a safer and more skilful way, an obvious starting point would be to examine what 'expert' road users do 
that is different to what 'novices' do. For example, since adults have many times fewer accidents than 
children in spite of massively increased exposure to risk, it would seem sensible to analyse the 
characteristics of their behaviour in different traffic situations. This might then provide a starting point for 
the formulation of educational objectives. Unfortunately, hardly any road safety programmes in this country 
have been developed on this basis. Instead, objectives have been set mainly on the basis of indirect criteria 
and on assumptions as to what children can and cannot do. This is not a strong basis from which to develop 
countermeasures aimed at combating what is, after all, the major problem of child health today. 
3. The view that, for maturational reasons, children cannot be expected to cope with anything but very 
simple traffic environments and are incapable of co-ordinating several variables at once needs to be re-
assessed. The evidence shows that, even at a very young age, children's actions and decision-making can be 
raised to a more sophisticated level, provided that appropriate training is provided. This point applies not 
only to the road safety field but to other fields of education as well. Whilst a good deal of progress has been 
made in this area, further research should be carried out to identify those skills that are trainable and the 
optimal conditions under which training should be conducted, taking into account the age and experience of 
the children involved. Further research must be conducted to inform about the types of training that are most 
sensitive in achieving these objectives. 
4. There is strong evidence that practical training is by far the most effective means of improving children's 
skills and judgements, particularly among younger children. In spite of widespread use, verbal approaches 
that concentrate primarily on the acquisition of knowledge and attitudes have not proved to be an effective 
way of improving the behaviour of children in traffic. There are strong developmental reasons why this 
should be so and we have commented on these in depth in this report. The arguments cast considerable 
doubts on the efficacy of much traditional road safety education. Although practical training has been 
advocated in major reports for at least 15 years, they have not been widely implemented for a variety of 
reasons, including the perceived resource implications. There is a strong need for the problems involved in 
implicating practical training to be addressed, with a view to determining how best such approaches might 
best be made.  
5. To this end, interactive learning approaches hold out considerable promise. It must be emphasised that 
these approaches differ fundamentally from traditional didactic teaching methods, drawing instead on the 
basic premise that learning takes place in a social context and that the significance and meaning of actions 
are shaped by the value attached to those actions by others, especially by peers. The social context of 
learning therefore provides opportunities for children to try out and explore the implications of their own 
ideas and decisions before committing themselves as individuals to the hazards of the traffic environment. 
Research evidence from other educational settings suggests that interactive learning would be entirely 
appropriate for helping children develop a deeper understanding of the principles that govern safe and 
dangerous traffic behaviours. 
6. Finally, it should hardly need stressing that any educational method, whatever its merits, is only as good 
as the content it aims to teach. It remains a problem in road safety education that objectives do not 
adequately specify the concrete outcomes that are to be expected as a direct result of the programme. 
Correspondingly, outcome evaluation has not generally achieved a high priority in road safety research, 
although there are recent signs that this situation may be changing. The latter trend is very much to be 
welcomed and should be encouraged. 
This review of the literature suggests the need for both basic and applied research. Among the main needs 
are the following: 
1. To develop a more comprehensive taxonomy of the skills necessary to interact safely with traffic. A 
number of these has already been discussed in this report. This analysis should be extended to give a more 
comprehensive picture of the skills involved and the ways in which they are deployed in different traffic 
situations.  
2. To identify a hierarchical, age-graded progression of the skills involved in traffic behaviour, from 
simple to complex. Any educational programme should fit into an overall plan whose aim should be to 
develop road skills in a systematic and hierarchical manner, taking into account the age and previous 
experience of the child. Each programme should thus evolve out of the achievements of previous 
programmes and lay foundations for the next. No comprehensive plan of this type exists at rhe moment. 
3. To explore children's attentional and visual search strategies in the context of traffic behaviour. The 
evidence suggests that children begin to demonstrate the rudiments of a systematic search strategy around 5 
years of age. However, it is apparent that children remain susceptible to the distracting effects of salient cues 
even once they have developed the capacity to carry out an organised search. Future research should 
examine what children of different ages find most salient and distracting. Laboratory studies show an early 
preference for colour over form and texture over shape but in the context of road behaviour what is it that 
children focus on? For example, one observation is that children often focus on cars whereas adults focus on 
gaps. This implies a shift from perception of the environment in terms of purely physical features to a 
perceptual strategy which is bound to action. More work is needed to clarify this shift towards an action-
based framework for making perceptual judgements.  
4. To examine whether improved visual search and attentional control strategies can be taught to 
children and, if so, at what ages. The importance of training children to improve their visual search and 
attentional control cannot be over-emphasised as it seems highly likely that these capacities are related to 
distractibility and accidents involving 'dashing out'. Already programmes have been developed in Germany 
that use behavioural techniques to improve this aspect of children's behaviour. Further research in this field 
is badly needed.  
5. To further investigate the nature of cognitive failure, impulsivity and distractibility. It has already 
been suggested that these may be related to attention and visual search deficits. The question of individual 
differences in cognitive style would seem worth exploring, particularly in relation to the dimension of 
impulsivity-reflectivity. While this dimension has perhaps not proved as useful as had been hoped, it has not 
been extensively invoked in relation to road safety judgements and this seems worth investigating. For 
example, the dimension may formally relate to the distinction between exploration and search (see Chapter 
2) and may reflect either temporary or more permanent features of an individual's cognitive style. Whether 
training can help reorient an 'impulsive' individual's attention and search strategies is an important area for 
research. 
6. To ascertain whether children have an accurate assessment of their movement capabilities and can 
calibrate this to visual information (e.g., road width) or other sensory information (e.g., auditory 
information about approaching vehicles). Such perceptuo-motor calibration would seem to be particularly 
dependent on practical experience. 
7. To explore possible behavioural differences between boys and girls that might explain the greater 
vulnerability of boys on the road. In view of the massive difference in vulnerability, it is surprising that we 
have no really convincing explanation of what gives rise to this difference. It seems likely that the effect will 
be partly explained by difference in exposure, although the evidence for this is also surprisingly flimsy. 
Further research on these sex differences is required. 
8. To explore how close an analogue to the real traffic environment is needed for classroom exercises 
to be effective. Whilst training at the roadside is likely to be the ideal to aim for and may be essential for 
some skills, it is clear that simulations using, for example, table top models can be effective in relation to 
others. It is possible that improvements in even basic perceptual judgements might be induced through 
appropriate simulations. For example, film or video might improve children's timing judgements or gap 
selection strategies. Computer simulations might serve a similar function. Given the practical difficulties of 
conducting extensive training at the kerbside, the possibility of improving judgements in this way should be 
given careful consideration. 
9. To develop suitable methods of training for relevant road crossing skills. It has already been 
suggested in Chapter 5 that adult-led or peer tutoring may be appropriate for the learning of many kinds of 
skill, whereas peer collaboration is likely to be of more benefit in promoting conceptual advance. Research 
is needed to establish the validity and generality of interactive learning approaches to road safety. 
10. To evaluate the efficacy of different types of guided instruction or collaborative work for the 
acquisition of different kinds of skill and understanding. Assuming that interactive learning is effective, 
research needs to identify which types of group work are most appropriate for different tasks, and what the 
size and composition of the groups should be. 
11. To explore the effectiveness of different trainers in effecting change in children of different ages. 
This raises the question of who should undertake road safety training. Can parents make effective trainers or 
should training be left to professionals such as teachers or road safety officers? Although the involvement of 
parents is often advocated, few studies have explored the effectiveness of parents as trainers. Studies should 
be conducted to establish how effective different types of trainer are likely to be with children of different 
ages and whether their effectiveness varies according to the complexity of the material being taught or other 
factors. This could have important implications for policy.  
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